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Intensive research efforts are currently taking place in the United States and abroad to
shape the next generation of nuclear power systems offering enhanced reliability and
safety along with better economics. Two design philosophies, with different technological
and market perspectives, are considered. One is to develop large systems relying on
evolutionary versions of the current dominant design, and the other is to go with small
and modular reactor technology such as the Modular Pebble Bed Reactor (MPBR).
This thesis examines the modular technology and its flexibility to add incremental
capacity to timely respond to market demand. The decision to invest in a ten-module
1,100MWe MPBR plant is analyzed as a sequence of compound options, where the
construction of each single module provides the decision maker with the option to build
the next module. The proposed valuation model uses an original binomial approach. We
demonstrate that, at any point in time, the value of a modular nuclear power plant has
two components: the value of the installed capacity and the value of the firm's option to
add capacity incrementally in the future. The modular technology provides additional
economic value due to its flexibility that the traditional Busbar cost analysis fails to
capture.
We analyze different scenarios that highlight the fact that the value of the expansion
option is particularly sensitive to the cost of the first module as compared with the
following ones. In addition we show that the expansion option value grows when the cost
is equalized among the modules to be built. This result leads to recommendations as to
the design of the peripheral support facilities and to a larger extent to the overall plant
layout.
This thesis ends by exposing policy recommendations as to the use of the real options
valuation methods in the regulatory framework that governs technology selection and
energy capacity expansion decisions.
Thesis Supervisor: Fred Moavenzadeh Thesis Supervisor: Gordon Kaufman
Title: Professor, Civil Engineering Title: Morris A. Adelman Professor of
Management Science
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Currently, numerous research activities to develop the next generation of nuclear power
energy systems are taking place in the United States and abroad. The goal of these
research programs is to develop new nuclear technologies offering significant advances
in the areas of safety, reliability and economics.
Two very different design philosophies are being investigated: on the one hand, large
systems relying mainly on evolutionary versions of the current Light Water Reactor
(LWR) dominant design and on the other hand small modular systems departing
substantially from the dominant design. While LWRs are typically large and complex
systems, modular reactors in contrast concentrate on simpler and more compact
designs offering inherent passive safety. In particular, the Modular Pebble Bed Reactor
(MPBR) is an 11OMWe electric power reactor that relies on a self-controlling fission
process eliminating the need for complex active safety systems. The envisaged MPBR
system has the potential to drastically reduce operation and maintenance costs as well
as construction costs through design standardization, modularization and prefabrication
of major components.
The conceptual MPBR plant consists of ten (10) independent and identical 11OMWe
modules sharing a common control room and other peripheral support facilities. The
small size of each reactor enables incremental (or modular) capacity extension: modules
can be built sequentially, adding capacity as needed. Such modularity allows to generate
early revenues, reduce financial charges, and minimize capital at risk. Moreover,
modular capacity extension enables rapid sequential completion if market conditions are
favorable or to delay capital expenditures if market expectations are low.
1.2 Objective and Scope
While the addition of nuclear power capacity depends mainly on governmental energy
policy and national and regional demand for electricity, the recent electricity markets
deregulation within the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
(OECD) countries has produced strong incentives for economic decision-making in the
electric power industry. Hence, the competitiveness of new nuclear technologies as
compared with alternative energy sources has become a prerequisite to their
commercial deployment.
Traditionally, capital investments in the power industry are valued using a static
discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis of the costs of producing electricity averaged over
the life-cycle of the plant, namely the lifetime-levelized Busbar cost of electricity.
However, DCF valuation techniques present inherent limitations resulting in the
undervaluation of uncertain capital investments when significant managerial flexibility is
present.
The objective of the present Thesis is to demonstrate that the flexible capacity
expansion offered by modular nuclear technologies is a significant source of economic
value, which is not captured by the traditional Busbar cost analysis. Hence, we propose
a real option approach to value the opportunity to invest in a ten module 1,100MWe
MPBR plant. We focus on the additional value that incremental capacity expansion can
confer to the overall investment program. The proposed economic valuation is based on
a binomial model. While we recognize that this model is a simplification of the realty, it
makes intermediate values and decision points visible and therefore enables to build
strong intuition about the sources of value embedded in the investment program.
The decision to invest in a ten-module 1,100MWe MPBR plant is viewed as a sequence
of compound options, where the construction of each single module provides the
decision maker with the option to build the next module. In fact, the decision of starting
the construction of one 11OMWe module is independent of the decision to build the next
modules. At the start of the project and indeed at any time during the construction of the
plant, the firm has the option to start or to delay the construction of the next module.
Upon completion of one module, the firm receives the value of the completed asset and
the option to invest in the next module.
The valuation of sequential compound options is a path-dependant problem difficult to
handle with binomial models. We present in Chapter 4 what we believe to be an original
algorithm that simplifies the analysis and yields a lower bound for the value of sequential
compound options.
1.3 Outline
The present Thesis is organized in six (6) chapters.
Chapter 2 presents the role of nuclear power in electricity generation in the United
States and other OECD countries. The current characteristics and performances of the
U.S. nuclear power industry are presented in perspective with the economic challenges
faced by the industry for the deployment of new capacity.
Chapter 3 concentrates on the commercial economics of nuclear power. We discuss the
main cost drivers of producing electricity from a nuclear power source, introduce the
traditional Busbar cost analysis and highlight how new design concepts can improve the
economics of nuclear power. In doing so, we also show why the traditional approach to
capital investment in the power sector is inadequate to properly value the next
generation of nuclear power systems. Finally, we present an overview of the MPBR
technology and its key innovative features along with the cost data necessary for the real
option model in Chapter 4.
Chapter 4 proposes first a review of the real options theory in capital investments. Then,
we explain why the decision to invest in a ten-module 1,100MWe MPBR plant should be
analyzed and valued as a sequential compound options problem. We introduce in
Section 4.3 what we believe to be a novel binomial algorithm for solving sequential
compound options. We explain in details the recursive formulas and the logical tests
incorporated in the algorithm. The proposed algorithm constitutes an approximation that
greatly simplifies the analysis of sequential compound options and yields a lower bound
for the value of the options (i.e. this is a conservative approach).
Chapter 5 presents and interprets the results of the numerical simulations done using
the model in Chapter 4. We base our analysis on three scenarios, each defined by a
different allocation of capital costs to each individual module. The results are subjected
to sensitivity analysis for the main parameters of the model.
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the present Thesis and proposes some guidelines for the
development of a flexible construction schedule for the MPBR system. We extend our
conclusions to include some notable policy implications regarding the nuclear regulatory
framework.
Chapter 2 Prospects and Challenges for
Nuclear Power in the United States
Recent electricity market deregulation within the Organization for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD) countries is producing strong incentives for cost
reduction and economic decision-making in the operation of and capital investments in
electricity-generating assets. The outlook for nuclear power, as for other power sources,
will thus be based increasingly on economic criteria.
Existing nuclear plants have been constantly improving their operating performance and
offer today operating costs competitive with fossil-fuelled plants. However, high capital
costs and long lead-time constitute the main economic drawbacks for the construction of
new nuclear power plants.
Currently, there is no clear advantage for any type of power plant and generating costs
depend largely upon governmental and local regulations. Nevertheless several factors
could favor the development of nuclear power such as increasing fossil fuel prices and
price volatility, restrictive carbon dioxide emissions regulations, simpler nuclear
regulatory frameworks, and positive results of ongoing research and development efforts
in nuclear engineering.
Commercial efficiency is a key component for the promotion of nuclear power but it
should be emphasized that wider energy, health, and environmental policy issues are
critical to any assessment of nuclear power. This Chapter concentrates on the
commercial economics' of nuclear power and is organized as follows. Sections 2.1 to
2.3 present an overview of the current role of nuclear power in the United States and
offer some comparisons with other OECD countries. Section 2.2 offers a schematic view
of the U.S. nuclear regulatory framework and Section 2.3 explains the evolution of the
U.S. commercial nuclear power and the performance of the industry. The recent
consolidation in the nuclear power industry is particularly emphasized in Section 2.4.
Finally, Section 2.5 addresses the economic challenges that nuclear power faces for its
expansion.
'Commercial economics of nuclear power does not include the evaluation of externalities, such as energy
security or pollution. "An externality exists when an economic transaction leads to uncompensated gain or
loss of welfare to another." (OECD/IEA, 2001)
2.1 Current Role of Nuclear Power in Electricity Generation
Even though nuclear power plants account for only 15% of the installed electricity
generating capacity in the countries of the OECD, they provide about one-quarter of the
total electricity generation. Figure 2.1 compares the share of electricity generation for the
different sources of fuel in the OECD, showing the respective share of nuclear. There
are wide variations among countries of the OECD from less than 4% of the production in
the Netherlands to more than three-quarter in France (OECD/IEA, 2001).
With 103 nuclear reactors in operation, the United States account for 30% of the OECD
nuclear capacity. In the U.S., the share of nuclear in electricity generation is around 20%
for only 12% of the total installed capacity. The reason for this discrepancy is that
nuclear power plants, by nature, are used almost exclusively for continuous power
production at their rated capacity, i.e. baseload power production. Due to low operating
costs, nuclear power plants are generally used whenever they are available. This is
reflected in the high utilization rate of nuclear power as shown in the electricity supply
curve for the OECD (around 75% of the total annual productive hours, Figure 2.2). The
exception to the strict baseload utilization of nuclear power is France, where nuclear
provides such a high proportion of the power that load-following operations are typically
used (OECD/IEA, 2001).
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2.2 U.S. Regulatory Framework
The nature of nuclear power entails a series of safety measures regulated by
governmental agencies at the Federal and State levels. The ultimate goal of these
regulations is to control commercial nuclear power activity and minimize the chances of
public exposure to radioactivity as a result of inappropriate operations or accidents. The
US regulatory framework is presented schematically in Figure 2.3. Two agencies play a
major role in regulating and controlling commercial nuclear activities:
* The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which grants licenses for new
reactor design, plant construction and operations, and overviews license
transfers in mergers and acquisitions;
* The Department of Energy (DOE), which principally overviews the fuel cycle and
the management of radioactive wastes resulting from decommissioning.
Generally, once a plant design has been approved by the NRC and construction permit
has been granted, a site-specific permit is required at the State level for construction of a
new plant. Licensing strategies can become quite complex and the process is time-
consuming.
00nn
Legal action for
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Figure 2.3: Schematic view of the U.S. nuclear regulatory framework.
DOE: Department of Energy. NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency
2.3 Development of Commercial Nuclear Power
The development of civilian nuclear technology originated in the early 1950s from
nuclear weapon military programs carried out by the United States, the United Kingdom,
and France. Nuclear power for civilian electricity generation started in the United
Kingdom in 1956 with the 50MWe Unit 1 of Calder Hall Station.
The US Navy research for the development of nuclear submarines had the most
profound impact on civilian nuclear technology and resulted in the current dominant
design. The goal of the program was to develop small nuclear reactor allowing for
extended autonomy for submarines and resulted in pressurized water reactors (PWR)
and boiling water reactors (BWR). These two types of reactors, regrouped under the
generic category of light water reactors, account today for 90% of the OECD nuclear
capacity, and the quasi-totality of the United States capacity. Those reactors require
enriched uranium, of which the United States had a ready supply from enrichment plants
built for military applications.
The rapid extension of civilian nuclear capacity in the 1960s coincided with rapid
economic growth and sharp increase in electricity demand. Early nuclear commercial
applications and research programs were financially supported by national governments
in the OECD resulting in a 40% growth of nuclear capacity in the 1960s.
Nuclear capacity continued to grow rapidly in the 1970s at an average rate of 27%,
reaching 10% of the total OECD electric capacity at the end of the decade. The two oil
chocks of 1973 and 1979/80 contributed to increasing the share of nuclear in total
electricity generation, as many countries were forced to re-evaluate their energy security
policy, despite reduced growth in total electricity demand (EIA, 2001). During the same
period, the United States directed its energy policy towards more nuclear power.
Between the two shocks, nuclear capacity in the United States was multiplied by 2.3
(Figure 2.4) while total energy demand grew only 21% (Figure 2.5). Nuclear share
accounted for 12.5 % of the US electricity generation in 1979.
The growth of nuclear capacity drastically slowed down in the United States during the
mid 1980s for two different reasons. First, the second oil shock decreased the overall
growth in electricity demand (Figure 2.5), reducing the need for any addition of capacity.
Second, the 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant's unit 2 (TMI 2),
the first serious accident with nuclear power, raised the question of nuclear safety and
had long term effects on nuclear power plant development in the United States.
As a result of the TMI 2 accident, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
established a moratorium on licensing: only plants ordered before 1979 were granted
operating licenses (57 operating licenses have been granted since 1980). No new
construction permits have been issued in the United States since 1978 resulting in a
stagnation of the installed nuclear capacity since the beginning of the 1990s (Figure 2.4).
This capacity is currently decreasing as more and more nuclear power plants are being
decommissioned.
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However, during the past decade, net generation from nuclear power in the U.S. has
increased by 42% while capacity slightly decreased, as highlighted in Figure 2.4.
Similarly, since the beginning of the 1990s the share of nuclear in the total electricity
generated in the United States has been maintained approximately constant (around 19-
20%) while the total electricity production continued to grow up at an average rate of
21% over the decade (Figure 2.5).
This trend is explained by the steadily increasing utilization rate and improving
performance of plants in operation over the past two decades reflected in higher
capacity factors2 (Figure 2.6) and shorter refueling outage3 (Figure 2.7). Enhanced
operational safety also contributed significantly to improving operations by decreasing
the number and time of scheduled and unscheduled shutdowns. These indicators show
that plants currently in operation are most probably approaching their maximum capacity
factor, which is limited by the need for periodic refueling (every 12 to 18 months),
maintenance and repair.
Recently, the U.S. nuclear power industry has witnessed an unprecedented merger and
acquisition wave resulting in a much more concentrated industry. The motivation for
consolidation is the belief on the part of many utilities that a company with several
nuclear power plants can operate them more efficiently than a company operating only
one or a few plants. The improved operating performance of nuclear power plants has
been largely supported by the consolidation of ownership and operations in the industry.
2 Capacity factor or utilization rate: ratio of the annual energy output over the rated capacity (i.e. maximum
electrical energy output).
3 Refueling outage: time necessary to change the nuclear fuel during which the plant is shut down.
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Figure 2.6: U.S. nuclear industry net capacity factor (1980-2001)
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2.4 Consolidation of the U.S. Nuclear Power Industry
Benefits of deregulated electricity markets are controversial among all, especially on the
demand side of the market. On the supply side however, competition produces strong
incentives to reduce capital and operating costs among utilities, suppliers of nuclear
equipment, fuel and services. Since the Energy Policy Act in 1992, marking the
beginning of electricity market deregulation in the U.S., generating companies have
been seeking to improve commercial performance by pooling expertise and
consolidating operations. Formally vertically-integrated, the industry is evolving towards
segmentation in generation, transmission, and distribution.
In particular, utilities have been prompt in concentrating ownership of nuclear power
plants in search of operating efficiency resulting from specialization and economies of
scale in operations. The emerging companies concentrate their core business in
operating nuclear plants (Table 2.1). They benefit from the centralization of competence
necessary to manage nuclear activities and from resource sharing among a large
collection of nuclear plants (Cave 2001, Rosenberg 2001). Figure 2.8 illustrates this
mechanism.
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Figure 2.8: Effects of consolidation of ownership or operation in the nuclear industry:
Specialization and economies of scale in operation.
Over the past decade, sales of nuclear units, mergers and acquisitions, and the creation
of nuclear joint-operating companies have resulted in far fewer and more specialized
companies. By early 2001, about 27 GWe of nuclear power, or over one-quarter of the
U.S. capacity, had been affected by the consolidation of nuclear capacity (Table 2.2).
As of the end of 1989, a total of 54 individual utilities had ownership interests in one of
the 112 operable nuclear plants. In 1995, 46 companies owned 108 plants, and only 24
companies owned 103 plants in 2001 (Cave, 2001). Figure 2.9 shows the recent
evolution of the number of firms in the nuclear industry and their respective share of the
U.S. capacity. Resulting firms have also increased their level of specialization in nuclear
activities. Today, half of the U.S. nuclear capacity is concentrated in six major
companies. Exelon, issued from the merger of PECO Energy and Unicom, holds alone
around 18% of this capacity (Figure 2.9 and Table 2.1).
As a consequence, most existing nuclear power plants are today in a sound economic
position and have operating costs 4 competitive with fossil-fueled plants. However, the
U.S. fleet is aging and total capacity is decreasing. Prospects for existing and potential
new plants are subject to a wide range of economic and policy uncertainties that will
affect eventual addition of capacity.
PECO, 4% TVA, 5%TVA, 5%
,L, 5%
ern, 6%
tergy, 6%
ke, 7%
13%
Exelon, 17%
Figure 2.9: Major players in the U.S. nuclear power industry in 1998 (on the left) and in 2001
(on the right). Percentages indicative of the number of nuclear units held by the company.
NMC: Nuclear Management Company, TVA: Tennessee Valley Authority.
Source: Cave (2001) and companies web sites as of March 2002.
Table 2.1: Level of specialization in nuclear power of the main
U.S. utilities and operators in 2002. Ranking by nuclear capacity level.
Total Installed Nuclear Capacity Share of Nuclear
Capacity [MWe] [MWe] Power [%]
Exelon 22,500 18,500 82%
Entergy 30,000 8,400 28%
Duke 19,300 7,000 36%
Dominion 21,000 5,300 25%
NMC* 4,500 4,500 100%
First Energy 13,000 3,800 29%
*NMC: Nuclear Management Company
Source: Companies web site as of March 2002.
4 Operating costs do not include construction costs and associated financing costs. See Section 3. 1.
%
Table 2.2: Consolidation of ownership or operation of
US nuclear power plants as of January 2001.
Net CapacityPlant Name N et Capacity New Owner or Operator Type of consolidation[MWe]
Beaver Valley 1&2 1,630 FirstEnergy Asset exchange (498 MWe)
Clinton 1 930 AmerGen (now Exelon) Sale / merger
Duane Arnold 520 Nuclear Management Co. Inter-utility management Co.
Fitzpatrick 816 Entergy Sale
Hope Creek 1,030 PSEG Power Sale (52 MWe share)
Indian Point 2
Indian Point 3
994
965
undecided
Entergy
Sale
Sale
Nuclear Management Co.
Nuclear Management Co.
Inter-utility management Co.
Inter-utility management Co.
Milstone 2&3
Nine Mile Point 1&2
2,024
1670
Dominion Resources
Constellation Energy
Oyster Ceek 650 AmerGen (now Exelon) Sale / merger
Pinnacle West (APS) Sale (610 MWe share)
Peach Bottom 2&3
Perry 1
Pilgrim 1
Point Beach 1&2
Prairie Island 1&2
2,200
1,160
670
970
1,025
PSEG Power, PECO
First Energy
Entergy
Nuclear Management Co.
Nuclear Management Co.
Sale (328 MWe share)
Asset exchange (164 MWe)
Sale
Inter-utility management Co.
Inter-utility management Co.
PSEG Power
Great Bay Power
Sale (328 MWe share)
Sale (35 MWe share)
Three Mile Island 1
Vermont Yankee
Total Affected
Capacity
786
510
AmerGen (now Exelon)
undecided
Sale / merger
Sale
26,796
Source: OECD/IEA, 20(
Kewaunee
Monticello
511
544
Palo Verde
Sale
Sale
3,810
Salem 1&2
Seabrook
2,230
1150
~
Sale
l
--
Sale
--
Sale
--
01.
2.5 Prospects for Existing Plants
Recently, many nuclear power plants reaching the end of their original 40 year expected
service life have been granted extension or renewal of their operating license by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Current expected operating life after license renewal
reaches up to 60 years.
There are strong economic incentives to extending the lifetime of nuclear plants in a
competitive electricity marketplace. Comparing both capital costs and total generating
costs of alternatives, it is often more attractive to keep operating nuclear plants running
than to build any other type of plant. Indeed, by keeping the plant in operation, the owner
delays substantial decommissioning costs, which typically range from $300 to $500
million per unit ($400k/MWe to $2,250k/MWe depending on the size of the plant) and
postpone capital costs associated with the construction of a new plant. On the other
hand, the license renewal process requires a formal review of the plant by the NRC for a
cost ranging from $10 to $50/kWe. Major capital refurbishments necessary for continuing
operation typically range from $100 to $300/kWe. Extending the operating life of nuclear
power plants is today competitive with investing in a new fossil-fueled plant or
refurbishing a coal plant (OECD/IEA, 2001).
However, as nuclear plants age, capital expenditures for maintenance and repair are
likely to increase substantially and place a high burden on generating costs. Eventually,
owners will face the need to compare closely the economics of continuing operations
with investing in new capacity. At that time, the alternative of refurbishing the plant and
extending the operating life further would not be an option anymore. Hence, owners will
have to consider building new capacity and will have to choose between evolutionary
versions of the current dominant design or disruptive technologies. New nuclear power
technologies, such as the new modular reactors currently under development (see
Chapter 3) would most probably be available at that time. Therefore, such technologies
should be carefully evaluated using appropriate valuation techniques.
Chapter 3 Toward Modular Nuclear Technology
Current research efforts in nuclear engineering are focusing on the development of the
next generation of nuclear power systems. As exposed in Chapter 2, competitiveness is
a pre-requisite to capital investment in the power industry and notably in nuclear power.
Therefore, careful valuation of existing and forthcoming technological alternatives is a
cornerstone to the deployment of new nuclear capacity.
This is not the purpose of the present Chapter to determine whether or not modular
nuclear technologies are competitive with existing technologies or alternative energy
sources. Rather, our goals are to (1) understand the main cost drivers of electricity
generation form nuclear power, (2) provide a benchmark for the costs of conventional
nuclear technologies and (3) point out how new design philosophy can improve the
economics of nuclear power. In doing so, we highlight why the traditional approach to
capital investment in the nuclear power sector is inadequate to value the next generation
of nuclear power systems.
Hence, Section 3.1 introduces the traditional approach to economic valuation in the
nuclear power industry and provides cost benchmarks for the current dominant design.
Section 3.2 discusses the economic issues that new nuclear systems shall address for
deployment and shows how current research paths may bring answers to these
concerns. Section 3.3 presents the design concepts and the current cost estimates for
the Modular Pebble Bed Reactor (MPBR) system. Emphasis is put on the modularity of
the technology and the construction sequence. We define in this last Section the
necessary cost data for the real option valuation of the MPBR system developed in
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.
3.1 Introduction to Nuclear Engineering Economics
This Section introduces the basics of commercial nuclear power economics necessary to
characterize the main cost drivers of electricity generation from a nuclear power plant.
Cost data presented in this Section reflect the actual costs of existing LWRs and are
intended to provide the reader with a benchmark for the evaluation of new modular
nuclear systems (Section 3.3). The total generating cost (or Busbar cost) is defined as
the lifetime levelized cost of producing electrical energy, including capital and financing
costs, operation and maintenance costs (including debt service), and fuel costs.
3.1.1 Capital Costs
The major component of generating cost from nuclear plants currently in operation is the
capital cost, which typically accounts for 60 to 75% of the total generation cost, while
reaching about 50% in coal-fired plants and only 25% in gas-fired plants.
Capital cost encompasses hard costs (or direct costs) and soft costs (or indirect costs).
Included in hard costs are land acquisition cost, direct construction cost including
materials, equipment and labor, and Mechanical, Electrical and Plumbing (MEP) cost
and all other costs related to the procurement of the plant. Included in soft costs are
permit, licensing and regulatory fees, architectural and engineering fees, and project
management oversight and consultant services. Table 3.3 lists direct and indirect costs
for a typical ten module 1,100 MWe MBPR plant.
Capital Cost = Hard (Direct) Cost + Soft (Indirect) Cost
The overnight specific capital cost [M$] is defined as the cost of the plant as if it could be
constructed instantaneously, excluding of any financing costs associated with the
construction. The overnight unit capital cost [$/kWe of installed capacity] is defined as
the overnight specific capital cost divided by the plant capacity. Existing operating LWR
plants have a overnight unit capital cost ranging from $1,400/KWe to $2,200/KWe as
compared to $1,200/KWe for coal-fired plants and $500/KWe for combined-cycle gas-
fired plants.
In a traditional nuclear engineering economic analysis (Section 3.1.3) the total capital
cost [M$] includes the financing charges accrued during the construction phase, while
the plant is not yet productive. These charges are accounted for in the Allowance for
Funds Used During Construction (AFUDC) fund. It should be noted that other financing
costs that are paid for during the operating phase are including in the operating costs.
Total Capital Cost = Overnight Specific Capital Cost
+ Allowance for Funds Used During Construction (AFUDC)
The two main cost drivers of the capital cost are (1) the financing costs accrued during
construction and (2) the labor costs associated with the highly skilled labor force
necessary for the construction of a nuclear power plant. The longer the construction time
until start of operation, the larger the financial charges accrued during construction. In
addition a longer construction period delays the generation and collection of revenue.
Therefore, the economic value of a nuclear power plant is highly dependent on
construction time' and the efficiencies resulting from economies of scale and/or
standardization.
In the past, the average construction time of nuclear power plants in the U.S. has
increased dramatically (Figure 3.1). In the 1960s it took five years on average to build a
plant. From 1984 onward it took on average of over 12 years to complete a nuclear
plant. In 1996 Watts Bar Unit 1, the last nuclear plant still under construction in the
United States, finally entered in operation, 23 years after its construction permit was
granted. All the plants in construction after the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident
experienced extended delays, and numerous projects were suspended or even stopped
during construction.
This past trend in the U.S. can be explained by a series of concomitant factors: the
(sometime overstated) public opposition to nuclear power, the regulatory scrutiny
resulting from the TMI accident, escalating costs, rapid expansion in size of units before
all difficulties were understood, and the lack of standardization of the overall industry -
utilities and manufacturers.
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Figure 3. 1: Average construction time for nuclear power plants.
Latest data are: USA 1996 (Watts Bar 1), France 2000 (Civaux 2), Japan 1996, World 1998.
Note: Average construction time is for plants connected
to the electrical network in the time interval indicated.
Source: IAEA, Reference Data Series No. 1, 1999, Table 14 (in OECD/IEA 2001).
Construction time is the time period between start of pre-construction activities and connection to the
electric network.
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In the past, the lack of standardization on the part of some utilities (many plants were
custom built to the utilities' specifications) and manufacturers in the United States and
the introduction of new regulations resulted in extended construction periods and high
capital costs. Countries such as France, Japan and Korea on the other hand have had a
more centralized industry typically controlled by and supported by the governments and
have enjoyed better cost control and faster construction time (Figure 3.1). The recent
consolidation of the American nuclear power sector and the evolution of the regulatory
framework should provide a better ground for improved construction time and
construction management of new nuclear capacity.
3.1.2 Operating Costs
The main operating costs of a nuclear power plant are operation and maintenance
(O&M), nuclear fuel, provisions for spent fuel management and disposal (or
reprocessing), and provisions for final closure of the plant (decommissioning).
Maintenance doe not include expenses for major refurbishments. The main driver of
operating cost is O&M, which typically accounts for 50 to 75% of operating costs for
LWRs, of which personnel is the single most important component: a medium size LWR
plant typically requires about 600 personnel for operations. Nuclear fuel accounts for 20
to 30% of operating costs, most of which is for fuel preparation.
Regulations typically require utilities to make regular payments in a sinking fund to build
up provisions for future liabilities, namely spent fuel management or disposal and
decommissioning. Provisions for spent fuel account for roughly 10% of operating costs,
and provisions for decommissioning account for less than 1%, on a levelized basis
(IEA/OECD, 2001).
The price of nuclear fuel is mostly dependant on the cost of conversion, enrichment, fuel
fabrication and final processing; uranium accounting only for 20 to 30% for LWRs' fuel
cost. In the past, prices of nuclear fuel to utilities have not been subjected to volatile
variations as other fossil fuels. The price trend has been declining since the mid-1980s
and is forecasted to be approximately flat over the next 20 years (Figure 3.2).
Nuclear power plants are mainly used for baseload power generation and operate at full
capacity whenever they operate. Hence operating costs are mostly constant. Coupled
with relatively flat fuel prices, the cost of fuel, including spent fuel disposal, represents an
approximately constant share of nuclear electricity generation (around 20%).
As discussed in Section 2.2, commercial nuclear activity is subjected to strict regulations
and controls designed to ensure safe operations. Safety regulations impact all
categories of costs, capital, O&M, and fuel costs, through licensing, controls and
provisions.
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Figure 3.2: Historical and forecasted fuel prices as of 1999, 1990-2020.
1999 dollars per million BTU. Source: DOE/EIA, 1999.
3.1.3 Traditional Economic Analysis: Busbar Cost of Electrical Energy
The traditional approach to valuing electricity generating capacity relies on a static
discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis of the costs of producing electricity averaged over
the life-cycle of the plant (Driscoll, 2002). First, capital-related costs and operating costs
are annualized (or levelized) by finding an uniform annual rate of expenditure (levelized
cost) that makes the present value of all the capital and operating costs equal to the
present value of the levelized cost. Formally, the equivalent uniform annual rate of
expenditure, AL, is found by solving the following equation:
ALe-r dt = tC(t)e-rtdt
where C(t) represent the capital and operating costs as a function of time, and r is the
firm's cost of capital.
The resulting levelized cost is then reduced to a unit generating cost by dividing it by the
plant rated capacity times the average capacity factor. This formulation of the unit
generating costs is called the lifetime-levelized busbar2 cost of electrical energy, eb, is
expressed in cents per kilowatt-hour (0/kWh) and is the sum of three terms: capital
related costs, operating and maintenance costs and fuel related costs (Table 3.1).
2 The busbar cost defines the generating cost at the exit of the plant, excluding transmission and
distribution.
Projections
Table 3.1: Busbar cost of electrical energy [cents/kWh].
Capital-related costs 3:
8766.L 2](
+ Operating and Maintenance costs:
100 yT(KO&M )l +8766.L 2
+ Fuel costs:
100 Fo B + yT
24 77B 1 2
Typical LWR value4where:
L Capacity factor
4 Annual rate of financial charges
r Discount rate, or cost of capital, including inflation rate
(K)-c Overnight unit capital cost
Y Escalation rate of O&M and fuel cost, including inflation rate
C Time required to construct the plant
T Prescribed useful life of the plant
(Ko&M)o Specific O&M costs as of the start of operations
9 Plant thermodynamic efficiency, net kW electricity produced per
kW of thermal energy consumed
Fo Net unit cost of nuclear fuel, first steady-state reload batch,
including financing and waste disposal, as of start of operations
B Burnup of discharged nuclear fuel (or fuel energy utilization)
0.85 -
0.15/ yr
0.12 /yr
$ 1,500/kWe
0.04 / yr
5 yrs
40 yrs
$95/kWe-yr
0.33 -
$2,000/kg of
uranium
45,000 MW-
days/metric ton
The term [1 + r/2]C results from the Taylor series expansion of the exponential term in the levelized cost.
The same remark holds for the O&M and fuel costs.
4 Driscoll, 2002.
Using the representative values in Table 3.1, the generating cost for an existing LWR is
estimated as follows5 :
Capital cost O&M Cost Fuel Cost
eb = 4.1 + 2.2 + 0.9 = 7.2 cents/kWh
The Busbar cost analysis is somewhat a controversial measure of economic
performance as it accounts only for costs and is particularly sensitive to the discount
rate, the rate of financial charges. For instance, using an annual rate of financial charges
of 13% and a discount rate of 10% reduces the capital cost to 3.3 cents/kWh and the
Busbar cost to 6.4 cents/kWh. However, this analysis is relevant for the evaluation of
installed capacity given that all capital cost parameters are known with certainty after
construction and given the small variability of operating costs.
3.2 Perspective for New Nuclear Capacity
Over the past decade, fossil-fueled plants have been favored by the industry despite
more stringent emissions regulations, mostly for the low initial capital investment
required. In particular, combined cycle gas-fired plants have shown the strongest growth
thanks to less expensive generation equipments, failing gas prices and flexible
operation. On the other hand, fossil-fueled plants are more sensitive to fuel price
volatility than nuclear power plants and expected higher oil and gas prices (Figure 3.2)
could have a major influence on the relative cost of new nuclear plants.
There is a lively debate as to whether new nuclear power plants shall be build or not, but
in any case, numerous research activities to develop new nuclear energy systems are
taking place in OECD countries, and particularly in the United States. While the future of
nuclear power depends mainly on governmental energy policy and the national and
regional demand for electricity, competitiveness as compared to fossil-fuelled power
plants is a prerequisite to any deployment of new nuclear capacity. This Section
discusses the economic issues that new nuclear systems shall address for deployment
and shows how current research paths may bring answers to the economic concerns. It
is not the purpose of this Section to demonstrate whether or not new generation of
nuclear reactors can be competitive. Rather, the objective is to point out how new design
philosophy can improve the economics of nuclear power.
As discussed in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.3, the capital cost is the major component of
nuclear power's total generating cost. Hence, the construction of any new nuclear plant
in the United States relies heavily on the ability to reduce construction costs through a
combination of economies of scale, series construction, design standardization, and
shorter construction time.
5 As noted in Section 2.4 the operating cot (i.e. O&M and fuel costs) is around 3.2 cents/kWh, which is
competitive with the cost of producing electricity from alternative energy sources.
3.2.1 Advanced Conventional Reactors
Most improvements in conventional reactors designs have been introduced in an
evolutionary fashion through small steps taking advantage of nuclear and non-nuclear
technology developments, such as turbines, control and instrumentation (IAEA 1997 in
OECD/IEA 2001). In the past, programs to develop advanced conventional reactors
have concentrated on large size units (1,000 to 1,500 MWe) and mid-size units (around
600 MWe), (Table 3.2).
Efforts have been focused in reducing capital costs (NEA, 2000) and resulted in shorter
construction time for the most recent units build in Korea and Japan (4 to 5 years,
Figure 3.1). New plants also benefit from longer operating life up to 50 to 60 years,
reducing the lifetime levelized generating cost. New designs aim at more compact and
simpler configuration with fewer safety-related components and rely mostly on simpler
designs and economies of scale.
According to the OECD's nuclear power survey actual plant construction has not always
realized the expectation that net economies of scale can be achieved when total
investment costs are considered because of greater system complexity (OECD/IEA,
2001). Reducing complexity of the system is a key to in improving commercial
performance by reducing capital costs, construction time, as well as improving operating
performance.
3.2.2 New Modular Reactors: Generation IV Initiative
It is argued that improving conventional reactors will not be sufficient to produce a clear
competitive advantage and does not fully address increasing safety and sustainability
concerns. As a result, new reactors departing substantially from the dominant design are
currently being investigated. The emphasis is on simpler more compact designs offering
inherent passive safety6 with the potential to drastically reduce operating costs as well as
construction cost through standardization.
In June 1999, the United States Department of Energy (DOE) launched the Generation
IV Nuclear Energy Systems initiative in response to the need for development of
advanced nuclear systems in the United States. The goal of the Generation IV initiative
is to identify one or more next-generation nuclear energy systems and focus subsequent
research activities. In January 2000 a group of countries (including Canada, France,
Japan, Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States among others) began
discussing a multi-lateral effort to develop Generation IV reactors.
Selected systems should be commercially deployed before 2030 and offer significant
advances in the areas of sustainability, safety and reliability, and economics.
Sustainability goals focus on fuel utilization, waste management, and nuclear weapons
6 Cooling of the core in nuclear systems with passive safety is achieved via natural heat
exchange from the core to the surroundings. No intervention is necessary. In the worse case
scenario of complete loss of coolant, the core temperature stays below a certain threshold and
no core meltdown can occur.
proliferation resistance. Safety and reliability goals focus on passive safety (eliminating
the need for emergency response), reliable operation, and investment protection.
Economics goals focus on competitive life-cycle generation costs and financial risk
(NERAC 2001, Todreas 2001).
From the commercial perspective, future technologies should in particular anticipate the
increased use of distributed power, which requires building smaller units. The concept of
small reactors is appealing to developing nations seeking to build their electric grids and
developed nations who want to add incremental capacity based on market demand. It is
anticipated that while Generation IV nuclear energy systems will primarily produce
electricity, they may also find it profitable to produce a broader range of energy products
beyond electricity such as process heat for hydrogen or potable water production
(Todreas 2001).
Many research efforts are currently focused on modular high-temperature gas-cooled
reactors (HTGR). In these reactors, an inert gas such as helium is used to cool the
reactor core (instead of water in LWR design). The gas is also used to transport the
thermal energy and drive a gas turbine to produce electricity. Proponents of the
technology cite the following advantages among others:
* Passive safety;
* Higher efficiency provided by gas turbines;
* Economic advantages at small size provided by design standardization, modular
construction and series construction (Section 3.3.3).
The concept of HTGR is not completely new and early research work was done in the
United States as early as the 1940s. The first prototypes were build simultaneously in
1959 in the United Kingdom (the Dragon reactor, 20MWe), in Germany (the AVR, 15
MWe) and in the United States (Peach Bottom 1, 40MWe). The German design
consisted in a steel containment vessel and used spherical fuel elements, or pebble bed,
that travel downward through the core. Commercial applications followed in the 1960s-
1980s, but research programs were stopped after the Chernobyl accident. A detailed
analysis of the evolution of the HTGR technology can be found in Brey, 2001.
Currently, renewed efforts (China, South Africa, and the United States) concentrate on
the development of Modular High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactor (MHTGR) as a
sustainable option for electricity generation. In particular, the Modular Pebble Bed
Reactor (MPBR) is about one tenth the size of today's large nuclear reactor (110 MWe)
and is the smallest commercial reactor currently under development (Table 3.2). The
South African utility Eskom is leading a joint venture that has been developing a
prototype reactor (called PBMR) since 1993 and plan to enter commercial operations by
2006. Their reactor follows the design licensed for operations in Germany in the 1980s.
Simultaneously, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and the Idaho National
Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) are developing an alternative design
for the MPBR. The MIT-INEEL MPBR design benefits from economics advantages
resulting from standardization, modularity, and series construction (Section 3.3).
Moreover, its small unit size allows for incremental addition of capacity as modules are
build in sequence resulting in early revenue generation, minimized capital at risk, and
reduced financial charges.
Table 3.2: Main reactors currently under development.
Design Type Net Submitting Organization
Capacity[MWe]
European Pressurized Water Reactor ACR 1,500 Siemens & Framatome ANP
(EPR)
Advanced Boiling Water Reactor ACR 1,350 General Electric Nuclear Energy
(ABWR)
SWR 1000 ACR 1,000 Framatome ANP
AP1000 ACR 1,000 Westinghouse Electric Company
AP600 ACR 600 Westinghouse Electric Company
International Reactor Innovative and NR 350 Westinghouse Electric Company
Secure (IRIS)
Gas Turbine Modular Helium Reactor NR 285 General Atomics
(GT-MHR)
Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) NR 110 Eskom
Modular Pebble Bed Reactor (MPBR) NR 110 MIT-INEEL
ACR: Advanced Conventional Reactor
NR: New Reactor
Source: Todreas, 2001.
3.3 Overview of the Modular Pebble Bed Reactor System
The specific design concept that will be presented and evaluated through rest of this
study is the MIT-INEEL design currently under development. The analysis does not
enter in the details of the nuclear engineering7 as our focus is on the construction
sequence and the cost estimates. Engineering and cost data provided in this Section
reflect the current level of the research and development process of the MPBR
technology. At this point in time, no demonstration reactor for the MIT-INEEL MPBR
design has been built yet.
3.3.1 Description of the MPBR Technology
The major design feature of the MPBR is the inherent passive safety provided by the
pebble bed fuel elements itself. In the pebble bed fuel design, the nuclear fuel is
embedded in a protective coating (see Appendix) that constitutes the primary barrier to
fission product release. However, this coating (silicon carbide layer) starts to breakdown
after being continuously exposed to temperatures in excess of 1,6000C for more than
200 hours. Thus the reactor is designed so the operating temperature of the core never
exceeds 1,600°C, even in the worse case scenario of complete loss of coolant and
without any intervention. The solution to this problem is found in the natural laws of heat
conduction, heat convection and radiation combined with a small reactor size. By limiting
the power density of the reactor (to 3.54 MW/m 3) and allowing for natural cooling, the
operating temperature of the core is kept below 1,6000C. This temperature is almost
1,5000C below the melting point of the uranium fuel which supports the design objective
of a meltdown free design. The low power density condition limits the thermal power of
the reactor to 250MWt. Moreover, neutronic considerations lead to a maximum core
diameter of 3.5 meters. A schematic view of the reactor is presented in Appendix.
Helium is used to cool the reactor core and transport the thermal energy to an
intermediate heat exchanger (IHX) that serves to separate the primary and the
secondary systems. The secondary system drives a gas turbine to produce electricity.
The high efficiency of gas turbines (45%) enables higher operating performance. The
resulting reactor core is a relatively small unit of 8 to 10 meters high, 3 meters in
diameter, 250MWt thermal power, 11OMWe electric power (see Appendix). The
11OMWe MPBR module regroup the reactor module, the IHX module, the
turbomachinery module (including the gas turbines and support equipment such as
recuperator, precoolers and compressors) and a forced-draft cooling system for heat
rejection (Figure 3.3). This design does not require costly containment for nuclear safety
purpose. However a concrete shield might be required to protect the reactor against
external threats such as plane crash or terrorist attack.
Moreover, the pebble bed fuel enables on-line refueling thus eliminating refueling
outage. This results in a higher capacity factor for a single 11OMWe unit.
7 For complete description of the nuclear system and reactor and fuel physics, refer to INEEL-MIT (2000)
and Kadak (2001c).
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Figure 3.3: 3-D schematic view of the 1 10OMWe MPBR module, MIT-INEEL design.
Source: Kadak, 2001a.
3.3.2 Physical Plant Layout
A typical layout of the plant consists of ten identical modules built sequentially, sharing
common control room, administration, and training and maintenance buildings
(Figure 3.4). Ensuring equipment accessibility for maintenance and operations was a
primary concern in the design of the plant layout.
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Figure 3.4: Ten-unit 1, 10OMWe MPBR plant layout (top view, distance in meters).
Source: Kadak, 2001a.
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3.3.3 Modularity
An alternative to economies of scale to reduce capital cost is to combine design
standardization, modular construction and series construction on which the MPBR
design is based. Lapp (1989) proposed a complete methodology for modular nuclear
power plant design and construction. The benefits of this approach cannot yet be
precisely estimated as reactor design is still on paper. However, initial research results
on the MPBR are encouraging (Kadak et al., 1998b, and Kadak, 2001a, b and c).
Design standardization resulting in a standard system design has the potential to
generate economies in engineering, licensing, procurement, and administration. The
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has recently established a design certification
process that allows designers to pre-certify their designs for construction. Several
certifications have been issued by the NRC but due to the high capital costs of these
plants, none have been built in the US to date. This approach should reduce the
administrative burden and its associated costs and increase the predictability of the
licensing process.
Given the small size of the system's components, a standard design enables series
production in the controlled environment of a factory, which is expected to generate
economies in production due to learning effects. Although there has been only limited
experience with serial production of nuclear components, proponents of modular
technologies argue that a parallel can be drawn with success in other industries such as
jet engines and naval ship building.
Because the system's components were designed to fit on a flatbed truck, pre-
assembled elements can then be shipped and assembled on site. Moreover, elements
can be assembled into modules and tested while site preparation work is still in
progress. When the site is ready, modules are simply moved into position and connected
to the system. This modular construction technique reduces considerably the on-site
labor required, the complexity of the on-site construction operations and the construction
time.
Economies of scale for each individual reactor are limited; however series production of
small units and modular construction techniques could provide a balance between
design and manufacturing costs, and economies of scale (Kadak, 2001b and Kadak et
al., 1998b). The economic analysis for an nth-of-a-kind (NOAK) module presented in
Table 3.3 incorporates anticipated learning effects to account for the benefits of factory
series construction and repetitive construction scheme.
A direct consequence of small generating capacity and modularity in construction is
modularity in capacity expansion. Small modules can be built sequentially, adding
capacity as needed and generating early revenue, reducing financial charges and
minimizing capital at risk. Modularity in capacity extension enables rapid sequential
completion if the market conditions are favorable or, to the contrary, to delay capital
expenditures if market expectations are low. This modularity provides the MPBR
technology with an additional source of value assessed captured by the real options
analysis in Chapter 4.
The concept of modularity in construction extends to the maintenance and operation of
the plant. Once a module is in operation, every component in the layout (Figure 3.4) is
accessible for maintenance or replacement. Should a component breakdown, the
corresponding unit would be shut down, the component removed and replaced by a
similar standard component fresh from the factory. This operating strategy limits the
down time necessary for repair. Moreover, only one unit out of the ten needs to be shut
down in the event of breakdown, resulting in a much higher overall capacity factor.
3.3.4 Fabrication and Construction Schedule
The concept of consortium ownership plays a central role in the manufacturing of
modular plant equipments. Usually, infrastructures (including nuclear plants) are
procured through a bidding process in which potential architects and engineers,
component manufacturers and building contractors participate. The MPBR design
however requires equity partners in manufacturing the nuclear reactor, the turbines and
compressor to fully benefit of serial fabrication, limit the time necessary for delivery and
avoid compatibility issues. It is anticipated that a single major vendor (such as General
Electric, Mitsubishi, or alike) would be contracted for those elements. Other components
such as the heat exchanger are standard in the industry and do not require such
partnership.
Estimated time from initial interest manifested by potential buyers until operation of the
first unit is 166 weeks. Actual construction time, i.e. the time from issuing equipment
purchase order and beginning site preparation until operation, is estimated to
123 weeks. A system dynamic model was build by Kadak et al. (1998b) to simulate the
effect of delays in construction on early revenue generation and total capital costs. A
complete fabrication and construction sequence is presented in Appendix.
3.3.5 MPBR Cost Estimate
The following cost projections for an nth-of-a-kind (NOAK) MPBR power plant are based
on the analysis performed by the pebble bed group at MIT (Kadak et al., 1998b). The
cost estimates are in accordance with the ground rules and recommendations
established by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (1993), the Gas Cooled Reactor
Associates (1993) and the particular assumptions of the MIT pebble bed group.
Estimates are in millions of January 1992 US dollars. The scope of this cost estimate
includes all costs to design, build and operate a MPBR plant over a 30 year lifetime.
Our purpose is not to discuss the assumptions or the exactitude of those estimates.
Rather, we intend to build on those results to show in Chapters 4 and 5 how a real
option approach can help uncover additional sources of value not captured in the
traditional Busbar cost of electricity.
* Capital cost
The major categories of capital cost are presented in Table 3.3 for a 1,100MWe ten
module plant. Total overnight specific capital cost is estimated at $2,2047million, the unit
capital cost is $1,860/kWe, and the total capital cost after AFUDC is $2,296million. The
resulting busbar cost is 25.0mills/kWh 8 with a fixed charge rate of 9.47%.
* O&M Cost
The MPBR annual O&M costs were estimated based on its simpler system design, its
passive safety, and its high capacity factor. The staff size is significantly lower than the
average 975 personnel required to operate current conventional American nuclear
power plants. On-site staff is expected to be 150 personnel. The MPBR plant O&M costs
is estimated to be $31.5million per year, and the busbar cost was 3.6mills/kWh at 90%
capacity factor (Table 3.4). We assume the same O&M cost for each individual module.
* Fuel Cycle Cost
The estimate of the fuel cost is based on the following: One pebble cost $20.0, one third
of the fuel pebbles is replace annually (i.e. 120,000 pebbles), and a fee of 1.0 mill/kWh is
charged to fuel cost for spent fuel management and disposal. Total fuel cost is estimated
to be $32.7 per year and the busbar cost 3.8 mills/kWh (Table 3.4).
* Decommissioning Cost
Decommissioning costs were estimated to be $211million for the entire plant, which
corresponds to 0.6mill/kWh (Table 3.4).
* Total Generation Cost
Total generation costs are summarized in Table 3.4. The above estimates yield a lifetime
levelized busbar cost of electricity of 33.0mills/kWh or 3.3 cents/kWh.
8 1 cent = 10 mills.
Table 3.3: MPBR ten-module 1, lOOMWe plant capital cost estimate.
Millions of January 1992 US dollars.
Account No. Description Cost Estimate
20 Land & Land Rights 2.5
21 Structures & Improvements 192
22 Reactor Plant Equipment 628
23 Turbine Plant Equipment 316
24 Electric Plant Equipment 64
25 Miscellaneous Plant Equipment 48
26 Heat Reject System 25
TOTAL DIRECT COSTS 1,276
91 Construction Service 111
92 Home Office Eng. & Service 63
93 Field Office Supv. & Service 54
94 Owner's Cost 147
TOTAL INDIRECT COSTS 375
TOTAL BASE CONSTRUCTION COST 1,651
Contengency 396
TOTAL OVERNIGHT SPECIFIC COST 2,047
UNIT CAPITAL COST [$/kWe] 1,860
AFUDC 250
TOTAL CAPITAL COST 2,296
Source: Kadak et al. (1998b).
Table 3.4: MPBR ten-module 1, 1 OOMWe plant Busbar generation cost estimate.
January 1992 US dollars.
Reactor Thermal Power [MWt]
Net efficiency [%]
Net Electrical Rating [Mwe]
Capacity Factor [%]
Total Overnight Cost [M$]
Unit Capital Cost [$/kWe]
Total Capital Cost [$M]
Fixed Charge Rate [%]
30 Year Levelized Costs [M$/yr]
Levelized Capital Cost
Annual O&M Cost
Level Fuel Cycle Cost
Level Decom. Cost
Revenue Requirement
BUSBAR COST [mill/kWh]
Capital
O&M
Fuel
Decom.
TOTAL
Source: Kadak et al. (1998b).
10 x 250
45.3
10x 110
90
2,046
1,860
2,296
9.47
217
31.5
32.7
5.4
286.6
25.0
3.6
3.8
0.6
33.0
Chapter 4 Real Option Approach to Investment
in Modular Nuclear Capacity
As illustrated in Chapter 3, the conventional Busbar cost analysis is based on
deterministic and static estimates of capital outlays, construction sequence and lead-
time etc... Such discounted cash flows techniques fall short of valuing the effect of the
sequential interdependence among uncertain capital investments over time.
We propose in this Chapter an option approach that incorporates the value of flexibility in
capacity expansion brought about by the modular production technology. We focus on
the incremental value that such flexibility confers to the investment program. The
valuation proposed is based on a discrete-time model, which makes intermediate values
and decision points visible and enables to build strong intuition about the source of value
embedded in the investment program.
Section 4.1 proposes a review of options theory and shows how it is applied in capital
investments with features similar to the investment decision we face. The binomial
valuation method is exposed in detail as it is used in Section 4.3 and Chapter 5 for the
resolution of the investment problem. Section 4.2 defines the option nature of the
investment problem. Finally, we introduced in Section 4.3 what we believe to be a novel
binomial algorithm for solving sequential compound options. We explain in details the
recursive formulas and the logical tests incorporated in the algorithm. The results of the
model are analyzed in Chapter 5.
4.1 Real Option Approach to Capital Investment
4.1.1 Background
Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) valuation techniques have inherent limitations when it
comes to valuing uncertain investment opportunities with significant flexibility and often
result in an undervaluation of projects. The Net Present Value (NPV) rule was first
derived to value fixed income securities and is based on two assumptions somewhat
inappropriate to value uncertain capital investments with managerial flexibility. NPV
assumes either (1) that investments are reversible (i.e. expenditures can be recovered
should market conditions turn unfavorable) or (2) that investments are in fact irreversible
but the investment program is static and that investment cannot be delayed (i.e. invest
now or lose the investment opportunity), (Dixit and Pindyck, 1995).
However, most capital investments are irreversible and can be delayed. A growing body
of literature, known as Real Options or Contingent-Claims Analysis, shows that the
ability to wait for new information and delay irreversible capital outlays can profoundly
affect the economic value of a project and change the investment decision (see Dixit and
Pindyck 1994 and 1995, Trigeorgis 1996, Luehrman 1997 and 1998, Brealey and Myers
2000, and Copeland and Antikarov 2001 for examples, valuation techniques and further
references).
The real options theory is based on an important analogy between financial options and
a firm's opportunity to invest in real assets. An option is a right, with no obligation, to buy
(call option) or sell (put option) an asset at a fixed predetermined price (exercise or strike
price) at any time before a given date (American option) or on a given date (European
option).
Similarly, a firm holding an opportunity to invest in a real asset is holding an option on
that asset (i.e. a claim on the stream of profits generated by that asset), comparable to a
financial call option. When the firm decides to invest, it exercises its option by making an
irreversible capital investment (equivalent to the strike price of a financial option).
Management's ability to wait for new information and adapt its investment program
consequently creates an asymmetry in the probability distribution of the program's NPV
that expands its true value by improving its upside potential and limiting the downside. In
this respect, the firm investment strategy can be regarded as the sequence of optimal
exercise of the set of real options it posses.
By deciding to go ahead with an irreversible capital expenditure, the firm "kills" the option
by giving up the opportunity to wait for new information that might have affected the
value of the option and the optimal exercise decision. The loss of the option at the time
of the investment represents an opportunity cost that must be incorporated in the
investment valuation. Dixit and Pindyck (1995) reformulate the NPV rule by incorporating
this opportunity cost as follows: "Instead of just being positive, the NPV of the expected
cash flows of the project must exceed the cost of the project by an amount equal to the
value of keeping the investment option alive."
Real options can be classified in two major categories: (1) single options that can be
analyzed in isolation (such as the option to defer an investment or the option to alter the
scale of operations) and (2) multiple options presenting interdependencies. In particular,
if the investment opportunity leads to further discretionary opportunities, then the option
is embedded in a set of nested or compound options (i.e. each option provides upon
exercise another option) and must be analyzed as part of a chain of investments. Geske
(1979) valued compound options, which can be applied to value sequential investments
or growth opportunities that become available only when earlier investments took place.
Another distinction must be drawn between proprietary options, for which the firm is the
only one to possess the investment opportunity, and shared options, for which the firm
shares the exercise rights with other players. A detailed classification of real options
along with examples and references is proposed by Trigeorgis, 1996.
The valuation of the optimal exercise of real options builds on the valuation of financial
options, which has been studied extensively by academics over the past three decades
(see Cox and Rubinstein 1985, Hull 2001). The quantitative origins of options theory
derives from the seminal work of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973). The
practice of valuing options was later simplified by Cox and Ross (1976) who recognized
that an option can be valued using an equivalent dynamic portfolio of traded securities
(replicating portfolio) and arbitrage-free pricing. This synthetic duplication enables risk-
neutral valuation that is, discounting certainty-equivalent cash flows (expected future
cash flows weighted by risk-neutral probabilities) at the risk-free rate of interest, rather
than the expected cash flows at the risk-adjusted discount rate.
4.1.2 Options in Capital Investment and Capacity Expansion
The option approach to capital investment has been the center of particular attention.
Pindyck (1988a) applied contingent-claims analysis to electricity-generating assets by
comparing two fictive investment programs: one in a large plant with low unit capital cost
and one in a small plant with high unit capital cost and the option to add capacity as
demand grows. He showed that under price uncertainty, the value gained by delaying
substantial capital outlay offered by the smaller plant made the investment in a smaller
plant preferable to a larger one. On the other hand, demand uncertainty has two
opposite effects. First, it creates an option of waiting to invest, and second it increases
the value of the underutilized capacity by making it more likely that this capacity will be
needed in the short term. The latter effect dominates in Pindyck's analysis. This model
can be used in investments presenting large demand uncertainty.
Madj and Pindyck (1985) proposed a general model for projects that take "time to build".
The project is analyzed using compound options: each dollar invested buys an option to
invest the next dollar. The analysis is structured as an optimal control problem, where
the maximum rate of investment is the control variable. The decision to invest or delay
depends on the value that the project would have if completed today.
Using a model based on the same general idea, Pindyck (1988b) shown that the value
of a firm can be split into the value of its installed capital and its options to expand its
production capacity in the future. We use this idea in Section 4.2 to show how the value
of a modular nuclear power plan is driven not only by the value of the installed capacity
by also by the option to add future increments of capacity.
Pindyck (1993) examined investments in projects that take time to complete and are
subject to cost uncertainty. The model is particularly suitable for the analysis of long
construction programs. Two sources of cost uncertainty are examined: (1) technical
Real options may be valued with the same techniques as financial options even
though they are not traded. The existence of a replicating portfolio of traded securities
perfectly correlated with the underlying asset in a complete market is sufficient to
value any contingent claim on an asset traded or not (Trigeorgis, 1996).
uncertainty, which is resolved as the investment proceeds (such as geotechnical
conditions) and (2) input cost uncertainty, such as external uncertainty over the price of
construction material, the labor cost and the effect of governmental regulations among
others. The model is used to analyze the decision to start and then continue or abandon
construction of a nuclear power plant. The model brings a justification for the
abandonment of nuclear power plant construction programs in the 1980s.
Some capital investments, such as oil and gas exploration and production, require a
sequence of capital outlays and are well suited for an analysis using compound options.
Paddock et al. (1988) studied the case of offshore petroleum leases using a series of
two compound options corresponding to exploration, development and extraction. Each
phase requires an irreversible capital expenditure and upon completion provides the
owner of the lease with the possibility to proceed to the next phase. Upon exercise of the
exploration option, the owner receives the value of the undeveloped reserve and the
option to develop it. Upon exercise of the development option, the owner receives the
right to exploit a developed reserve and produce oil. The values of the underlying
undeveloped and developed reserves are determined using a petroleum market
equilibrium model.
Thomas (1992) applied some contingent-claims models to nuclear economics. He
considered several operating options, time-to-build option and a valuation for two
compound options for capacity expansion in continuous time. He compared three fictive
investment programs in nuclear power plants with various operating and capital costs
but presenting the same Busbar cost. Thomas demonstrated that the Busbar cost of
electricity is not an appropriate measure of the economic value of a nuclear plant when
significant operating options or construction modularity is present.
4.1.3 Binomial Model
Dynamic programming solves optimal decision problems by rolling out all possible
values of the underlying asset during a given limited time frame and folding back the
value of the optimal investment decision in the current period. The rational for this
approach is expressed by the Bellman Principle: "Given the choice of an initial strategy,
the optimal strategy in the next period is the one that would be chosen if the entire
analysis were to begin in the next period."
Cox, Ross and Rubinstein's (1979) binomial approach enables a simplified valuation of
the optimal exercise of options in discrete time. The binomial valuation model is based
on a simple representation of the evolution of the value of the underlying asset. Starting
at the value Vat time zero at the beginning of the lattice, the underlying asset can only
take two possible values in the next period: up with probability p, or down with probability
q= (1-p). In the multiplicative or geometric binomial model, the values in the next period
can be either uVin the up case or dVin the down case' (with u>1 and d<1). In the next
period, the set of possible values of the underlying asset is: u2V, udV, cdV. This random
This representation assumes no cash payout (similar to no dividend in the case of a stock). This
assumption is later relaxed.
walk is illustrated in the value tree of the underlying asset in Figure 4.1. The entire set of
possible asset values is obtained by progressing forward along the tree.
The random walk represented by the geometric binomial model is a discretization of a
geometric Brownian motion described in Equation 4.1. This process contains two
components: and exponential growth rate (or drift) characterizing the long-term expected
return on the asset, and a stochastic term describing random variations of the value of
the asset around the long-term trend. This process yields a lognormal distribution of
relative changes in the asset value.
dV
= d dt + dz (4.1)
V
where p is the expected return on the asset V, u is the standard deviation of the
expected returns on V or volatility2 , and dz = c dt is an increment of a Weiner process
(or Brownian motion), s is a normally distributed random variable, with mean zero and
standard deviation 1.
In the binomial discrete approach the respective amplitude of an up event and a down
event are estimated using:
u =e t/ and d=1/u (4.2)
where n is the numbers of steps used to simulate a one-period event. For instance, if
o=10% is the annual volatility, and we use 12 steps per year, then At =1 year, n = 12
steps per year, then u = 1.02929, and d = 0.9715.
The risk-neutral probabilities of an up event and a down event are given respectively by3:
r-d
• = and q=l-p (4.3)
u-d
where r = 1 + risk-free rate of interest, u is the one-period asset price change for an up
event, d is the one-period asset price change for an down event. Note that the condition
d < r < u must apply to avoid arbitrage opportunities.
2 Refer to Cox and Rubinstein 1985 for the methodology in estimating the parameters r and p.
3The expected return on the asset is: (probability of an up event)xu +(probability of a down event) xd. If p is
the risk-neutral probability, then p is the probability of an up event that makes the return on the asset equal
to the risk-free rate. Therefore, p xu + (1 -p) xd - r, and p = (r-d)/(u-d).
The American call option with two periods to maturity on the asset modeled by the two
period-binomial tree in Figure 4.1 is valued using a backward recursion from boundary
conditions. At the end of the second period (terminal nodes A, B and C, Figure 4.1),
since there are no more periods remaining, the optimal exercise of the option is written
as follow:
C,t, = Max [u2V - k,OJ
Cid = Max [udV - k,O]
Cdd = Max [d 2V-k,O]
where C is the value of the option and k is the exercise price.
Working backward along the tree and using a recursive procedure the value of the
option is obtained at each node. The value of the option at the end of the first period
(nodes D and E, Figure 4.1), is obtained by comparing the value of the option if
exercised now with the value of the unexercised option or continuing value. The
continuing value is obtained by discounting the certainty-equivalent cash flows (expected
future cash flows weighted by risk-neutral probabilities) at the risk-free rate of interest:
C,, = Max [u V - k, (pC1 ,, +qC,,d )/]
Cd = Max [dV - k, (pC,, +qCdd )/r]
The value of the option in the current period (node F, Figure 4.1) is obtained in the very
same way:
C = Max [V - k,(pCu +qCd)/r]
uV
dV ~udV
dV d2
0
0
Time
Option Value Tree
Probability
/Cu = MAX
(p*Cu+q*Cd)/r \Cd=MAX
'Cd = MAX
uV-k
u2V-k
Cuu = MAX
0
(p*Cu+q*Cd)/r CudMAX udV-k
Cud = MAX
dV-k -• 0
(p*Cu+q*Cd)/r Cdd = MAX d2V-k
0
Backward4---
Where: V is the value of the asset in the current period,k is the exercise price, r = 1 + risk-free rate of interest,
u is the one-period asset price change for an up event, d is the one-period asset price change for an down event.
p is the probability of an up event, q = 1-p is the probability of a down event. Assuming no cash payout.
Figure 4. 1: Option valuation binomial model.
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There is no problem in incorporating cash payout (i.e. cash flows from the asset to the
owner similar to dividends on a stock) in a multiplicative tree, assuming that cash flows
are proportional to the value of the underlying asset (Figure 4.2). Again, the value of the
option at each decision node is obtained by comparing the value of the option if
exercised now with the continuing value.
If exercised now, the payoff of the option is the value of the asset pre-dividend; if
unexercised, the continuing value is based on the asset value ex-dividend. For instance,
given a constant payout rate t, and assuming V is the value of the asset pre-dividend in
the current period, the value of the asset in the next period in the up state (node D in
Figure 4.1) is uV(1- 8) pre-dividend, and uV(1- 8)2 ex-dividend. Then the value in node
A is u2V(1- 6)2 pre-dividend and iuV(1- 37) ex-dividend. In node D, the option value if
exercised now is uV(1- 8) -k and the continuing value is:
Sp.Max [u2V(1- )2,01 +qMax udV(1 -_)2,0] }r
When there is no dividend, it is never optimal to exercise the option early (i.e. the
continuing value is always greater than the immediate exercise value). However, this is
not the case for a dividend-paying asset, and the higher the payout rate, the higher the
probability of early exercise.
Pre-dividend Pre-dividend
uV Ex-dividend
uV(1 -6)
dV(1-6)
Ex-dividend
u2V(1-6)
I u2V(1-6)2
udV(1-6)
SudV(1-6)2
udV(1-8)
l• udV(1-8) 2
d2V(1-6)
I d2V(1-6) 2
Figure 4.2: Asset value tree showing values pre- and ex-dividend.
V
lime
I----
The valuation procedure in continuous time is not exposed in this study as our model is
based on a discrete-time valuation. The interested reader can refer to Dixit and Pindyck
(1994) and Trigeorgis (1996).
4.2 Option Nature of the Investment Program
Consider a generation company, which holds the modular nuclear technology and plans
on building a power plant with N units of capacity (one unit of capacity is one 11 MWe
MPBR module). The final size of the plant, N, is determined exogenously. Modules are
built sequentially, adding capacity as needed.
At any point during the life of the project, the value of the investment program has two
components: the value of installed capacity (i.e., the value of the expected flow of profits
generated by the capital currently in place4) and the value of the firm's option to add
capacity in the future (Pindyck, 1988b).
Letting K be the amount of capacity [MWe] in place, P the price of electrical energy
[$/kWh], the current value5 of the project Wcan be written as the sum of two parts:
W = V(K,P)+ F(K,P) (4.4)
where V(K,P) is the value of the capacity in place, that is, the present value of expected
flow of profit that this capacity will generate given the expected evolution of prices;
F(K,P) is the value of the firm's "expansion option"', that is, the option to expand capacity
given the capacity in place at any point in the future. F(K,P) represents an additional
source of value, which is not captured by the traditional DCF approach, nor by the
Busbar cost analysis.
The investment program is a contingent asset, whose payoff depends on the value of a
more basic asset, namely the incremental unit of capacity (i.e. one 110OMWe MPBR
module). Thus we can derive the value of the project as a contingent claim for a given
level of installed capacity. To solve the investment problem, we need to determine the
value of an incremental unit of capacity on the one hand, and the value of the option to
add capacity in the other hand.
Noting that capacity is added incrementally (one module at a time), sequentially (one
module after another) and in a lumpy fashion (sizeable amount of capacity in each
increment), we can view the project as a sequential investment program and rewrite
Equation (4.4) for any given stage corresponding to a discrete addition of capacity.
4 In the general case of the valuation of a productive asset, the firm's operating options, i.e. the option to
utilize or not the installed capacity depending on the level of price, should be incorporated in the valuation
of the capital in place. However, such options are not readily available in the case of nuclear power, as
nuclear plants operate generally at full capacity whenever they operate (see Chapter 2).
5 W is the current value of the project. To obtain the net value, the incurred capital cost must be subtracted.
Consider units 1 to n < N have been installed so far, the current value of the project is
given by:
W, =Y AV(Ki,P)+ AF(Kn+, P) (4.5)
i=0
where AV(K,,P) is the value of the i th unit of capacity, that is, the present value of
expected flow of incremental profit attributable to this unit; AF(Kn+1,P) is the value of the
option to add the n + 1st unit of capacity, provided that n units have already been
installed. Note that for n = N, AF = 0.
When the firm exercises the n + 1 st option it receives an asset worth AV(Kn,,,P) and an
option to build the n + 2nd unit of capacity. Hence the opportunity to add capacity
incrementally provided by the modularity of the technology can be described as a series
of sequential compound options and must be valued as such.
4.3 Binomial Approach for Modular Nuclear Technology:
Practical Methodology
A discrete-time formulation enables to account for the lumpiness of capacity addition and
the discrete nature of firm's decisions, which are effectively revised on a periodic basis.
Moreover, intermediate values and decision points are made visible, which enables the
analyst to build strong intuition about the source of value of the option and thus better
communicate the results of the model.
4.3.1 Assumptions
To keep the size and complexity of the model manageable a number of simplifying
assumptions are required. Nonetheless, we intend to preserve the basic nature of the
investment problem and capture the value generated by modularity. Assumptions are
grouped in three categories: (1) structure of the investment program and characteristics
of the asset, (2) characteristics of the firm making the investment, (3) financial market.
1. We consider a capital investment program with the following structure:
* Investment is irreversible: capital invested may not be costlessly recovered and
the asset in place has no other use and no salvage value.
* Capacity may be expanded and is added incrementally (one unit at a time),
sequentially (one unit after another) and in a lumpy fashion (sizeable amount of
capacity in each increment).
* The final size of the plant is fixed. Capacity can be expanded up to a maximum
capacity.
* The technical risk is uncorrelated to market risk; it is unsystematic and thus can
be diversified entirely.
* Construction takes time. The capital cost corresponding to the construction of
one unit of capacity is incurred at the time the decision to build the unit is taken.
Indirect construction costs are assumed to be negligible until construction begins.
There is no possibility to defer or abandon or defer the construction of a unit once
it started.
* A single good is produced: electricity sold on the spot market.
* Operating costs are uncorrelated with the market and assumed constant.
* Cash payout is assumed proportional to the value of the underlying asset. The
cash payout rate is constant over time.
* The firm may not temporarily shut down production.
* The market value of the completed project is determined by the present value of
the stream of future profits it generates over its operating life discounted at the
owner's cost of capital.
* The investment opportunity may not be deferred indefinitely.
* The plant has a fixed operating life. Capital does not depreciate until the end of
the operating life, at which point the value of the capital drops to zero.
These assumptions require some additional comments in the context of the MPBR
technology:
The capital cost of a unit of capacity (i.e. the exercise price of the option) corresponds to
the overnight specific capital cost (defined in Section 3.1.1), which is defined as the cost
of the asset as if it could be constructed instantaneously, excluding of financial charges.
This definition fits with the assumption of an instantaneous cash outlay for the
construction of a unit of capacity.
Constant operating costs are justified by the constant level of personnel required to
operate the plant and the small volatility of nuclear fuel prices. We used constant
operating costs determined using lifetime levelized operating costs presented in
Chapter 3.
Given the nature of nuclear power (Chapter 2), an installed unit of capacity is assumed
to produce at maximum capacity (corresponding to a 90% capacity factor, see Chapter
3) for its entire lifetime, and production cannot be temporarily stopped.
The assumption of a limited life of the investment opportunity is restrictive but necessary
for a discrete-time analysis. It is realistic nonetheless for a large enough timeframe.
Thus, we assume that the first five (5) units must be installed before the end of a ten (10)
year period, and that the last five (5) units must be installed the before the end of a
twenty (20) year period. This assumption limits the life of the first five options to ten (10)
years and the life of the last five options to twenty (20) years. This is necessary because
discrete-time binomial model cannot handle perpetual options. However, the planning
time horizon is reasonable given an expected three year construction time per module
and provided that several modules can be under construction at the same time.
Moreover, we need to assume that the supporting industry for the MPBR system is fully
developed.
2. We shall assume that this firm possessing the investment opportunity has the
following characteristics:
* The capital structure of the firm is 100% equity6.
* The firm's goal is to maximize expected profit.
* The firm is a price-taker. Demand uncertainty is ignored.
* There is no depreciation of capital.
3. The financial market is modeled as follows:
* The market is complete, i.e. any market-correlated risk may be spanned by a
portfolio of existing assets.
* The market competition is perfect. There are no arbitrage opportunities.
* The market is frictionless, i.e. there are no taxes, no transaction costs, no
restriction on long or short sales.
* The riskless rate of interest is known with certainty at time zero and is assumed
constant.
* Inflation is ignored.
Assumption regarding depreciation and taxes can be easily relaxed and depreciation
and taxes can conveniently be incorporated into the analysis of the free cash flows
generated by the asset. However, given the precision of the estimates of costs available
at this point in the MPBR development process, this refinement would not add much
useful information.
6 See Masson and Merton (1985) for the application of contingent claims analysis for firms with leveraged
capital structures.
4.3.2 Choice of the Underlying Asset
The choice of underlying asset for the option is a fundamental step in application of real
option valuation methods. The application of options theory to value real options requires
(1) that a replicating portfolio must be identifiable and (2) to identify the evolution in time
of the value of the underlying asset (Section 4.1.1).
Because a unit of capacity produces only electricity, which is sold on the spot market,
the value of the plant at time zero is the present value of its future free cash flows
resulting form the sale of electricity discounted at the firm's cost of capital. Assuming that
operating costs are uncorrelated with the market, the non-diversifiable risk component of
the rate of return on the plant is thus perfectly correlated with electricity prices. We
choose the value of a unit of capacity (i.e. one 11OMWe MPBR module) as the
underlying asset and assume a complete market. This is a sufficient condition for the
application of option theory in the valuation of the investment opportunity (Section 4.1.1).
All sources of uncertainty concerning operating costs, demand and prices can be
combined in a Monte Carlo simulation to generate the present value of the underlying
asset at time zero. In particular, this simulation procedure allows us to incorporate any
stochastic model for the price of electricity. As the goal of this study is to demonstrate
the use of option analysis to value modularity in nuclear technology, we used a simplified
approach based on the following assumptions:
* Fixed operating costs calculated using the lifetime levelized operating cost
estimate as presented in Table 3.4;
* Constant price of electricity of $0.04/kWh;
* 10% annual cost of capital for the firm;
* 30 year operating life
Furthermore, we assume without justification, that the value of the asset evolves
according to a geometric Brownian motion7 . The volatility of the asset is entered as a
parameter subject to sensitivity analysis (Section 5.4). The resulting static present value
of the underlying asset at time zero is AV= $356 million.
Each module has the same present value, i.e. each unit has the same operating costs
and we neglect economies of scale in operation. Consequently, each module has the
exact same market value at any point in time. This assumption can be relaxed by
considering a different underlying asset for each option, but would increase substantially
the size of the model.
7 More elaborated models, incorporating stochastic variations of electricity prices, can be found in Skantze
and Ilic (2001).
4.3.3 Binomial Model
Figure 4.3 presents a matrix formulation of the binomial process for the asset value of a
single module, where the column index j describes the time evolution and the line index i
describes the state evolution (up or down events). Using this triangular matrix form we
can write a general recursive formula providing the value of the a single unit of installed
capacity pre-dividend, A V(i,j), in state i and time j:
For integers
For integers AV(i, j)= u j-id' AV(1- 6) (4.6)ij e [0,hj i< j
where AV is the value of unit of a installed capacity pre-dividend at time zero, AV(i,j) is
the value of a unit of installed capacity pre-dividend in state i and time j, h is the
maximum number of periods in the binomial tree, u is the one-period asset price change
for an up event, d is the one-period asset price change for an down event, ( is the
constant cash payout rate.
Asset Value Tree Matrix Representation
Time, j 0 1 2
u2AV State, i
uAV 0 AV uAV u2AV
AV udAV
AdAV 1 dAV udAV
d2AV
2 d AV
Figure 4.3: Matrix representation of the binomial process, no dividend.
A V is the value of a single module at time zero.
The timeframe for the analysis is 20 years (Section 4.3.1). We fixed the time steps
arbitrarily to four (4) per year. This quarterly basis for the evaluation was chosen to keep
the size of the trees manageable and considering that corporate investment decisions
are revised every quarter. Time steps could be refined further (e.g. weekly) without more
difficulty and decision points could be introduced in every time step or at more distant
intervals (e.g. quarterly).
As a result, the underlying asset binomial lattice presents h = 80 periods, corresponding
to a 80x80 triangular matrix.
An American option on one unit of capacity is valued using the following recursive
formulas:
* Terminal tree nodes:
For integers
ie [O,h], j=h C(i, h)= Max[AV(i, h)- k,O]
* Intermediate tree nodes:
For integers
i, j e [O,hl i< j C(i, j)= Max[AV(i, j)-k,(pC(i, j +1)+ qC(i + 1, j + 1))/r]
4.3.4 Compound Options and Conditional Exercise
Let us now turn to the evaluation of the compound options by considering first that we
can build two modules sequentially. Upon exercise of the second option (OPT2), the
owner receives the second unit of capacity. Upon exercise of the first option (OPT1) the
owner receives the first unit of capacity and the right to build the second module, i.e. the
owners receives the first unit of capacity and the second option. The first and the second
module of capacity have the exact same market value at the same time. Equation 4.7
needs to be modified as follows to value OPT1:
* Terminal tree nodes:
For integers
i [O,h],j=h
* Intermediate tree nodes:
(4.8a)
For integers
i,je[O,h]
i j
C(i, j)= Max[AV(i, j)+C2 (i, j)-k,(pCl(i,j + l)+qC(i + 1, j+ ))/r] (4.8b)
where CI(i,j) is the value of OPT1 and C2 (i,j) is the value of OPT2 in state i and
time j.
However, the construction of the second module cannot start before the beginning of the
construction of the first module. Standing at time zero, we can value the compound
options by recognizing that we can either exercise OPT1 or keep it alive and wait for the
next period. If OPT1 is exercised at time zero then the second option can be exercised
in the next period. It is said that the exercise of OPT1 uncovers OPT2. In other words,
(4.7a)
(4.7b)
Cl(i,h)= Max[AV(i,h)+ C2(i,h)- k, O
the starting date of OPT2 is conditional to the exercise of OPT1. If in state i and
time j < h, OPT1 has been exercised, then OPT 2 can be valued using Equation (4.7.b).
If in state i and time j < h OPT1 has not been exercised, then OPT2 cannot be exercised
and its value lies only in the continuing value. It must be valued using:
For integers C2(i, j)= Max[O, (pC2(i, j+l)+qC2(i+1, j+l r (4.8c)
i, j c [O,h] i_ j
The series of possible exercise dates of OPT1 has to be determined proceeding forward
in time in the binomial tree. The exercise of OPT1 is therefore a path-dependent problem
and consequently, the starting date of OPT2 is also a path-dependant problem. Because
the binomial valuation algorithm proceeds backwards, it is not possible standing in state i
and time j to know which path would be followed to arrive in (i,,j) and thus it is not
possible to know for the collection of state histories up to an including time j that leads to
state i if OPT1 has been exercised in the previous period(s). Such path-dependant
problems can be solved numerically using Monte Carlo simulation8.
We solve this path-dependant problem in a binomial setting using the following
approximation:
This approximation yields a lower bound for the option value, because it disregards
potential paths where OPT1 could have been exercised in the previous period. However,
given that the time lag is only one period, this approximation has little influence on the
exact value of the option.
Consider now a series of sequential compound options. The algorithm for valuation of
the n+lst option conditional upon the exercise of the nth option with maturity Mn is given
in Figure 4.4. This algorithm contains two logical tests:
* This first test says that if time j is greater than the maturity of the nth option, then
the n+lst option can be exercised immediately and is valued using the greater of
the immediate exercise value and the continuing value; else proceed to the
second test.
* The second test says that if the nth option has been exercised in the previous
period (here "exercised" refer to the simplified condition defined in the box
above), then the n+lst option is valued using the greater of the immediate
exercise value and the continuing value; else the n+ls' option is valued using the
greater of the continuing value and zero.
See Hull (2001) for the use of Monte Carlo simulation in option valuation.
If in state i and time j there exists at least one path for which OPT1 has never been
exercised in the previous period, then OPT2 cannot be exercised in state i and
time j.
Thus, our binomial algorithm requires a backward induction and a conditional exercise
algorithm (Figure 4.4) that requires a forward induction. Coupling the two algorithms, our
valuation requires both backward and forward iterations along the binomial trees paths.
We speak therefore of a "backward-forward algorithm"9.
4.3.5 Investment and Construction Lags
The above analysis assumes that a unit of capacity can be build instantaneously. The
holder of the option to invest could thus receive immediately upon exercise the full value
of the asset and the full option value to invest in the next unit.
In fact, the holder of the option receives the asset only after a time lag corresponding to
the construction time1o of the unit. Moreover, even though the owner receives the option
to build the n + 1st unit of capacity immediately upon exercise of the nth option, the firm
might not be able to start the construction of the nth unit immediately because of limited
resources (physical constraints on the building site, limited production capacity,
maximum rate at which the firm can invest productively...). Construction and investment
lags have two distinct effects on the valuation. These two constraints however both tend
to decrease the value of the investment opportunity (by limiting flexibility).
1. The construction lag reduces the value of the stream of profits from the asset.
Let T be the construction time lag. By beginning construction at time j, the firm has a
claim to receive the value of the unit of installed capacity at time j + T. The value at time
j of the claim to receive a unit of installed capacity at time j + T is simply its present value
(Paddock et al. 1988). Let p be the required rate of return to the owner, the present
value at time j of one unit of installed capacity received at time j + T, AV(j), is:
A (j)= e-p TE[AV(j + T)]
where E[.] denotes the expectation operator, E[AV(j+T)] is the expected value of the
asset at time j + T, and p the required rate of return on AVto the owner.
The expected value of the asset at time j + T is given by its expected future value:
E[AV(ji+T)] e(P-)TAV(j)
9 The term "backward-forward algorithm" was used by Professor Copeland to describe the valuation of
another type of path-dependant problem (switching options) during the MIT Sloan Proseminar on Real
Options (15.976), on April 4 h, 2002.
°
0We define the construction time as the time necessary to bring one unit of capacity in production. This
includes prefabrication, site preparation, site assembly, fueling, and testing.
Thus, the present value of one unit of installed capacity is:
For integers j e [o,h] AV(j)= AV(j) eT (49)
and T e [0,h- j]
The actual asset underlying the series of compound options is the present value of one
unit of installed capacity received after the construction lag. However, AV follows the
same evolution process as AV, so that we can simply replace AV by AV to value the
investment program. Thus, the binomial recursive formulation in Equation 4.6 is adjusted
as follows:
For integers
i, j, E[0,hl i!j AV(i, j)=u j-idi e-TAV(1-,)J (4.10)
and Te [O,h- j]
where AV is the value of one unit of capacity at time zero if it could be constructed
overnight and AV(i, j)is the value of one unit of capacity at time zero considering a
construction lag, t.
2. The investment lag restricts the exercise of the option to invest incrementally and
reduces its value.
Let t be the investment lag, t integer and t [0, j]. The option to invest in the next unit
cannot be exercised immediately after it is received. Instead, there is a period during
which exercise is restricted. In that sense, the option to invest becomes an exotic
American option similar to the one fund in warrants issued by a company on its own
stock limiting exercise during the first years of the life of the option and sometimes used
in employee incentive schemes. Such an option is called a forward start option".
To incorporate the investment lag into the binomial value tree of the option, we used a
restrictive condition on the early exercise of the option. We face the same path-
dependent problem as exposed in Section 4.3.4, and we use a similar approximation.
Considering again two compound options for sake of simplicity:
If in state i and time j there exists at least one path for which OPT1 has never been
exercised at time j - t, then OPT2 cannot be exercise in state i and time j.
' Hull (2001) provides a simple analytic solution for the value of the option in the case of a European call.
This approximation also yields a lower bound for the option value, because it disregards
potential paths where OPT1 could have been exercised in previous periods. The
influence of this approximation on the option value increases as the investment lag
increases; i.e. as more and more paths are disregarded. However, the investment time
lag in our analysis is kept small relative to the maturity of the option.
Considering now a series of sequential compound options the algorithm for the valuation
of the n+l s' option conditional upon the exercise of the nth option with maturity Mn taking
into account the construction Tand investment lag t is given in Figure 4.5. This algorithm
is an extension of the one presented in Figure 4.4 and contains two logical tests:
* This first test says that if the time j is greater than the sum of the maturity of the
n thoption and the investment lag, then the n+lst option can be exercised
immediately and is valued using the greater of the immediate exercise value and
the continuing value; else proceed to the second test.
* The second test says that if the nth option has been exercised in the period j-t
(here "exercised" refer to the simplified condition exposed in the box above), then
the n+lst option is valued using the greater of the immediate exercise value and
the continuing value; else the n+ 1st option is valued using the greater value of the
continuing value and zero.
Figure 4.4: Algorithm for conditional exercise of sequential compound options.
Valuation of n + 1st option in state i and time j, C n+' (i,j
conditional to the exercise of nth option in state i and time j - 1 C " (i,j- 1).
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Figure 4.5: Algorithm for conditional exercise of sequential compound options
when there is an investment lag, t.
Valuation of n + 1st option in state i and time j, C n+l (i),
conditional to the exercise of nth option in state i and time j - t C " (i-t).
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Chapter 5 Characteristics of the Solution to
the Investment Problem
This Chapter presents and interprets the results of the numerical simulations done using
the model in Chapter 4. As exposed in Sections 4.3.4 and 4.3.5, the model yields a
lower bound for the compound option value. We limit our analysis to three scenarios for
the potential capital cost of each individual module. These scenarios are defined in
Section 5.1 along with base case parameters. We present three sets of results. Section
5.2 discusses the effects of compounding on the relative value of each option for the
base case parameters. Section 5.3 explains the interdependence of construction and
investment lags. Finally, Section 5.4 presents a sensitivity analysis on some key
parameters with a particular emphasis on the unexpected influence of volatility.
5.1 Base Case Scenarios
5.1.1 Definition of the Scenarios
To the best of our knowledge, no cost analysis of the exact construction sequence for an
nth-of-a-kind (NOAK) plant has been performed to date. In particular, we found no
information on the size of the common facilities necessary to start operation and how
many modules these initial facilities could support before extension is needed. Hence,
the capital cost incurred for the construction of each individual module has not yet been
established. This information is however required for a real option analysis because the
capital cost of the nth module represents the exercise price of the option to invest in the
nth unit of capacity. As discussed in Section 4.3.1, the exercise price of each option in
the sequence is the overnight specific capital cost of the corresponding module.
Thus, we generated three scenarios; each is based on a different allocation of capital
costs to each individual module. In order to do so, we performed the cost segregations
presented in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, based on the original plant cost breakdown shown in
Table 3.3. Our cost segregation for the first and second scenarios is based on the
following assumptions that we believe to be a reasonable proxy for the actual capital
costs: The common facilities initially built are sufficient to support operation up to the 5 th
module. Then, the common facilities that are built to support the 6 th module are sufficient
to support operation up to the 10 th module.
We believe these three scenarios cover a wide range of possible cases and provide
good insights into the investment problem. Moreover, they represent three different
starting points for the value of the first option: in the first scenario OPT1 starts deep-out-
of-the-money', in the second scenario OPT1 starts in-the-money (near-the-money), and
in the third scenario OPT1 starts deep-in-the-money. These scenarios are described
below and summarized in Table 5.3.
We allocate the cost of the common facilities and the indirect costs
among the 10 units as shown on Table 5.1. Reactors and turbines
equipments, field office supervision and services and owner's costs are
spread evenly through the ten units. Land cost is charged entirely to the
first module. Other costs (mainly for the common facilities) are allocated
as follows: 31% is charged for the 1st unit, 19% for the 6th unit and 50%
evenly to the remaining units. In this way, the cost of the lstmodule is
estimated to $346million, the cost the 6 th module to $269million and the
cost of units 2 to 5 and 7 to 10 to $179 (Table 5.1).
We modify Scenario 1 to allocate the costs of common facilities as
follows: 15% is charged for the 1st unit, 10% for the 6 th unit and 75%
evenly to the remaining units. In this way, the cost of the 1stmodule is
estimated to $249million, the cost the 6th module to $217million and the
cost of units 2 to 5 and 7 to 10 to $198 (Table 5.2).
Scenario 1.
Scenario 2.
Scenario 3. all units,
by 10 the
An option is said to be in-the-money (respectively out-of-the-money) when the value of its underlying
asset is greater (lower) than its exercise price. It would pay to exercise immediately. An option is said to be
deep-in-the-money when the value of its underlying asset is much greater than its exercise price.
We assume that all costs could be evenly spread among
resulting in an estimated cost of $205million per module (divide
total overnight capital cost in Table 3.3).
Table 5. 1: Scenario 1 - Capital Cost Estimate per module for a MPBR 1 10MWe module.
Segregation based on the cost estimates for a 10 module plant in Table 3.3.
Millions of January 1992 US dollars.
Account No. Description Cost Estimate
Module 1 Modules 2-5 Module 6 Modules 7-10
20 Land & Land Rights 2.5 0 0 0
21 Structures & Improvements 60.0 12 36.0 12
22 Reactor Plant Equipment 62.8 62.8 62.8 62.8
23 Turbine Plant Equipment 31.6 31.6 31.6 31.6
24 Electric Plant Equipment 20.0 4 12.0 4
25 Miscellaneous Plant Equipment 15.0 3 9.0 3
26 Heat Reject System 12.5 0 12.5 0
TOTAL DIRECT COSTS 204 113 164 113
91 Construction Service 34.7 6.9 20.8 6.9
92 Home Office Eng. & Service 19.7 3.9 11.8 3.9
93 Field Office Supv. & Service 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4
94 Owner's Cost 14.7 14.7 14.7 14.7
TOTAL INDIRECT COSTS 74 31 53 31
TOTAL BASE CONSTRUCTION COST 279 144 217 144
Contengency [24%] 67 35 52 35
TOTAL OVERNIGHT SPECIFIC COST 346 179 269 179
UNIT CAPITAL COST [$/kWe] 3,144 1,628 2,442 1,628
AFUDC 42 22 33 22
TOTAL CAPITAL COST PER MODULE 388 201 301 201
TOTAL CAPITAL COST FOR THE PLA 2,296
AFUDC: Allowance for Fund Used During Construction (See Section 3.1.1).
Table 5.2: Scenario 2 - Capital Cost Estimate per module for a MPBR 1 1OMWe module.
Segregation based on the cost estimates for a 10 module plant in Table 3.3.
Millions of January 1992 US dollars.
Account No. Description Cost Estimate
Module 1 Modules 2-5 Module 6 Modules 7-10
20 Land & Land Rights 2.5 0 0 0
21 Structures & Improvements 48.0 12 48.0 12
22 Reactor Plant Equipment 62.8 62.8 62.8 62.8
23 Turbine Plant Equipment 31.6 31.6 31.6 31.6
24 Electric Plant Equipment 16.0 4 16.0 4
25 Miscellaneous Plant Equipment 12.0 3 12.0 3
26 Heat Reject System 12.5 0 12.5 0
TOTAL DIRECT COSTS 185 113 183 113
91 Construction Service 27.8 6.9 27.8 6.9
92 Home Office Eng. & Service 15.8 3.9 15.8 3.9
93 Field Office Supv. & Service 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4
94 Owner's Cost 14.7 14.7 14.7 14.7
TOTAL INDIRECT COSTS 64 31 64 31
TOTAL BASE CONSTRUCTION COST 249 144 247 144
Contengency [24%] 60 35 59 35
TOTAL OVERNIGHT SPECIFIC COST 309 179 306 179
UNIT CAPITAL COST [$/kWe] 2,807 1,628 2,779 1,628
AFUDC [12%] 38 22 37 22
TOTAL CAPITAL COST PER MODULE 346 201 343 201
TOTAL CAPITAL COST FOR THE PLANT 2,296
AFUDC: Allowance for Fund Used During Construction (See Section 3.1.1).
5.1.2 Base Case Parameters
Unless otherwise noted, we set the parameters of the investment program as presented
in Table 5.3. We fixed the time steps in the binomial model to four (4) per year. Options
values and exercise prices are in January 92 million dollars.
Table 5.3: Base case parameters.
Input parameters
Current value of the underlying 356
Annual risk free rate 3.5%
Annual payout rate 10.0%
Annual standard deviation 12.0%
Number of steps per year 4
Number of years 20
Construction lag [steps] 12
Investment lag [steps] 1
Scenario 1
Option OPT 1 OPT 2 to 5 OPT 6 OPT 7 to 10
Exercise price [$million] 346 179 269 179
Maturity [periods] 40 40 80 80
Scenario 2
Option OPT 1 OPT 2 to 5 OPT 6 OPT 7 to 10
Exercise price [$million] 249 198 217 198
Maturity [periods] 40 40 80 80
Scenario 3
Option OPT 1 OPT 2 to 5 OPT 6 OPT 7 to 10
Exercise price [$million] 205 205 205 205
Maturity [periods] 40 40 80 80
5.2 Relative Value of Each Option and Compounding Effects
In the first scenario, the value of the option to build the first unit of capacity (OPT1) is
$23million (Figure 5.1a). This value can be interpreted as the net present value at time
zero of the investment program, whose first phase (only) has a present value of
$356million and a standard deviation of 12% per year, and requires investment in ten
stages. Because of construction lag (see Equation 4.9) the present value of the asset is
reduced to $264million. Consequently, without the option component, the first phase of
the investment program would have a negative $82million NPV 2 if the firm were to invest
now.
On the other hand, if the firm were to invest today, it would exercise the option to build
the first unit of capacity and give up the possibility of waiting for new information. This
lost value of the option represents an opportunity cost that must be taken into account in
the investment decision. Hence, for the firm to invest today, the value of the first module
should exceed its capital cost by an amount at least equal to keeping the first option
alive, i.e. $23 million in this case. The firm should only invest when the value of the
payoff of the option if exercised now is larger than the continuing value. Critical values of
the asset for which it is optimal to invest now are readily available in the option binomial
tree and can be revised each period.
As discussed in Section 4.2, at any point during the life of the project, the value of the
investment program has two components: the value of installed capacity and the value
of the firm's option to add capacity in the future. For instance, if at time zero, three
modules have already been installed, the option component of the remaining investment
program is the value of the fourth option. This option to expand capacity incrementally
still has a significant value: $17million, for the first scenario (Figure 5.1a).
The critical value of the underlying asset that triggers the exercise of each option is
readily available in the binomial tree. This is illustrated in the abstract from the binomial
model presented in Figure 5.2. This abstract shows the value tree of the underlying
asset and the value trees of the first and second options up to ten periods in the future
for the second scenario. Shaded areas in the options value trees show the value of the
option when it is exercised. The corresponding value of the asset can be read directly in
the asset value tree. The value of the first option (as well as the value of the other
options in the sequence) evolves in time as shown in Figure 5.2.
The relative value of each option is shown in Figure 5.1 for 12% annual volatility and
10% payout rate. The downward sloping curves resulting from the second and third
scenarios correspond to what we would expect intuitively (Figures 5.1b and c): the value
of the investment program grows as the number of embedded expansion options
increases. Indeed, in the third scenario all options in the sequence have the same
exercise price. The option to invest in the last module (OPT10) is the option to acquire
one unit of installed capacity for an exercise price EX10, and the option to invest in the
ninth module (OPT9) is the option to acquire one unit of installed capacity and OPT10
for an exercise price EX9 = EX10. Thus the value of OPT9 is greater than the value of
2 Value module 1 x e-constr. lagx(payout rate/4) capitalcostmodule 1 = 356e - 12 x (0 10 /4) -346 = -82
OPT10. The same argument holds for all options in the sequence and the value of the
option increases gradually as we move from OPT10 to OPT1. This is the compounding
effect.
In the first scenario however, the relatively higher exercise prices of OPT6 and OPT1
disrupt this compounding effect and reduce significantly the value of each option in the
sequence and consequently reduce the value of the option to invest in the first module.
The large difference between the exercise prices of the first and the second options
causes the value of OPT1 to be lower than OPT2, hence the change in slope between
the first and second options in Figure 5.1a.
The value of the investment program is thus highly sensitive to the relative cost of the
first module as compared with the next ones. In particular, the value of the incremental
expansion option reaches its highest value when the cost of each individual module is
the same (scenario 3, Figure 5.1c). However, even if the first phase of the project
exhibits a large negative NPV (in the first scenario), the possibility to add capacity
incrementally confers the investment program with a positive present value, and the
project should therefore be undertaken whenever the value of the payoff of the option is
larger than the continuing value.
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Figure 5. la: Scenario 1. Options value as a function for o = 12% and 6 = 10% per annum.
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5.3 Construction and Investment Lags
The dependence of the options values to the construction time is highlighted in
Figure 5.3. As expected, increasing construction time decreases the options values by
diminishing the present value of the underlying asset and thus delaying the exercise of
the options (see Equation 4.9). The general shape of the curve describing the relative
value of each option in the sequence discussed in Section 5.2 still holds. However, the
difference in value between two consecutive options gets smaller as the construction
time increases. Note that the value of the first three options decreases sharply as the
construction time increases: this slope is determined by the payout rate. A six month
construction delay (from 12 to 14 quarters) reduces the value of the first option by
approximately one-third in each scenario (respectively from $23million to $16million,
from $55million to $34million and from $140million to $100 million in scenarios 1, 2
and 3).
The interdependence of construction and investment lags is illustrated for the first option
in Figure 5.4. On the one hand, the investment lag restricts the possibility of early
exercise, resulting in lower option value. On the other hand, longer construction times
decrease the value of the underlying asset, consequently delaying the decision to invest
in the next increment of capacity. Hence, as the construction time grows, the waiting
time between two investment decisions increases and the influence of the investment
lag on the option value decreases. For long enough construction times, the waiting time
between two sequential capital outlays becomes larger than the investment lag, which
has no influence on the option value anymore. Note that the investment lag affects all
the more the value of the option as the probability of early exercise is high, that is as the
first option is deeper-in-the-money (compare Figures 5.4a, b and c). In other words, the
deeper-in the-money the option, the more its value is affected by the investment lag.
Value Tree for the underlying asset pre-dividends with construction lag
Time j
State i 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
0 264 273 283 293 3041 315 327 338 351 363 376
1 242 251 260 270 279 290 300 311- 322 334
2 223 231 239 248 257 266 276 286 296
3 205 212 220 228 236 245 253 263
4 188 195 202 209 217 225 233
5 173 179 186 192 199 207
6 159 165 171 177 183
Investment threshold for OPT1
8 134 139 144
9 -..- .-. --. --- ------------------- 123 128
10 Investment threshold for OPT2 113
11
Value Tree for Option 2
Time j
State i 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
39 54 75 105 149 212 254 306 373 458 570
21 28 39 53 72 99 136 187 257 310
11 16 21 29 40 55 75 102 140
6 9 12 16 23 31 42 57
3 5 6 9 13 17 24
2 2 3 5 7 10
1 1 2 2 3
0 1 1 1
OPT2 execise region 0 0 0
0 0
0
Value Tree for Option 1
Time j
State i 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
5 5 78 109 150 204 278 331 395 474 
572 697
26 140 187 249 330 395
51 72 102 139 187
18 26 36 51 72
6 9 13 19 26
2 3 5 7 9
1 1 1 2 3
0 0 1 1
0 0 0
) r)
0
Figure 5.2: Scenario 2. Compound options binomial model. Underlying asset value tree and
value trees for the first and second option out of ten compound options in the series for the
first ten periods, with construction and investment lags.
Definition of the investment thresholds and options exercise region.
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5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
This section discuses the influence on the valuation of the base case parameters,
namely the volatility, the payout rate, the initial value of a unit of installed capacity, and
the risk free rate of interest.
* Volatility
The value of the compound option is highly sensitive to the volatility in the value of a unit
of installed capacity (irrespective of investors or managers risk preference). This
dependence is shown in Figures 5.5 and 5.6. The first scenario exhibits expected
increasing option value for increasing volatility (Figures 5.5a and 5.6a). Note again the
relative value of OPT1, OPT2 and OPT3: as volatility increases, the compounding effect
is reinforced and the value of each individual option in the sequence tends to be higher
than the next option.
The third scenario however exhibits unexpected and counterintuitive results. Figure 5.5c
presents a "U" shape: option values decreases with increasing volatility for relatively low
volatilities (below 10%); then option value increases with increasing volatility for high
volatilities (between 10 and 20%). We offer the following plausible explanation to this
behavior:
In the third scenario, the first option at time zero is deep-in-the-money and is
exercised immediately for high payout rates. The remaining options are also deep-in-
the-money but cannot be exercised immediately because of the sequential
investment condition and the investment lag: sequential options are not active before
the previous option has been exercised. Hence, for a two period investment lag, the
second option is uncovered after two periods; the third option is uncovered after four
periods, and so on.
For low level of volatility and high payout rate (5= 10% in the base case) the asset
value tree exhibits slowly increasing asset values in time or even decreasing asset
values in time (see Figure 4.2). Small increase in volatility generates larger amplitude
of the up and down movements in the asset value in time, increasing the value of the
asset in up events and decreasing the value of the asset in down events. However,
this results in fewer cases in which the options are being exercised: options are still
exercised in an up event but are not exercised in a down event. Consequently, the
continuing value of the inactive options decreases and the compounding effect
decreases the value of all options in the sequence. This effect is attenuated for large
enough volatility and we observe increasing option value for increasing volatility in
this case. We believe this effect might be created by the approximation we use to
model the sequential exercise of the options and the investment lag (Sections 4.3.4
and 4.3.5).
As 6 --+ oo, the value of the compound option goes to zero and volatility has no
influence on it; the only choices are invest now or never. As S --+ 0, the options are
exercised only at maturity (it is never optimal to exercise early an American option on
a non-dividend paying stock), and the compound option behaves as European
options. Thus increasing volatility increases the compound option's value.
Moreover, we assumed that the payout rate 6 was independent of other parameters
in the model; i.e. notably independent of the volatility a. In fact, this might not be the
case (see Dixit and Pindyck 1994 for a discussion of the dependence of 6 and a). A
more thorough analysis of the combined effect of 8 and a on the options values is
warranted.
In the second scenario, the first option starts in-the-money and near-the-money: this
represents a case somewhere between the first and third scenarios. Hence, the second
scenario (Figure 5.5b) shows patterns observed in the two other scenarios. OPT1 and
OPT2 follow the same pattern as observed in the third scenario: decreasing compound
option value with increasing volatility for volatilities below 6%, and then increasing
compound option value with increasing volatility. Values of the other options (from OPT3
onward) exhibit increasing options values with increasing volatility.
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Figure 5.5c: Scenario 3. Options value as a function of volatility.
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Figure 5.6a: Scenario 1. Options value as a function of volatility.
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Figure 5.6b: Scenario 3. Options value as a function of volatility.
* Risk free rate of interest
Figure 5.7 shows option value as a function of the risk free rate for the first scenario
(similar curves are observable for the other scenarios). As explained in Section 4.1.3, in
the binomial model the condition d < r < u must apply to avoid arbitrage opportunities.
Therefore, for a 12% annual volatility, our analysis is limited to a 6% annual risk free
rate.
If the risk free rate of interest, r, increases, the options values increase. Dixit and
Pindyck (1994) provide the following rational to explain this variation: The present value
of the capital expenditure k made at time j is ke-r, but the present value of the one unit of
capacity, AV, received at time j is AVe - j'. Hence, if the payout rate 5is fixed, increasing r
reduces the present value of the cost without affecting the present value of the
underlying asset. On the other hand, we note that for sequential compound options,
increasing r reduces the present value of the inactive options (Section 4.1.3). Those two
opposing effects result in the convex curves in Figure 5.7.
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) further note that while an increase in the risk free rate raises
the value of the firm's option to invest, it also results in fewer of these options being
exercised. As a result, higher interest rates reduce actual investment by increasing the
opportunity cost of investing now. In the standard NPV valuation model, higher risk free
rate also reduces the amount of investment by increasing the cost of capital.
* Initial value of the underlying asset
As expected, increasing value of the underlying asset at time zero increases the value of
the firm's investment opportunity (Figure 5.8). Moreover, for the first scenario, a high
enough initial value of a unit of capacity pushes the first option in-the-money and above
the value of the third and second options (compare Figure 5.8a with Figure 5.1 a).
Finally, irregularities in the curves and surfaces presented in this Chapter are due to the
discrete nature of the investment decisions and modeling approximations. In particular,
the change in slope occurring at OPT6 observable in Figures 5.1a, 5.2a and 5.5a is due
to the change the options maturity (10 years for OPT1 to OPT5 and 20 years for OPT6
to OPT10). This change is more sensitive for the first scenario: on the one hand, the
options are deep-out-of-the-money, which tends to delay investment decisions; on the
other hand the exercise is forced after ten years, which increases the value of OPT 5 to
OPT1 (hence the change in slope).
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Figure 5.7: Scenario 1. Options value as a function of the risk free rate of interest,
o-= 12%, 8= 10%.
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Figure 5.8a: Scenario 1. Options value as a function of
the initial value of one unit of installed capacity, o = 12%, 6= 10%.
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Chapter 6 Conclusions and Recommendations
The opportunity provided by the modularity of the Modular Pebble Bed Reactor (MPBR)
technology to add incremental capacity is analyzed and valued in this Thesis as a series
of sequential compound options. Our contribution is twofold. First, we demonstrated that,
at any point in time, the value of a modular nuclear power plant has two components: the
value of the installed capacity and the value of the firm's option to add capacity
incrementally in the future. Second, we contributed to the real options literature by
developing an algorithm that simplifies the analysis of sequential compound options
using binomial trees.
The additional source of value given by the option to add capacity incrementally cannot
be captured by a standard discounted cash flow (DCF) valuation. The traditional Busbar
cost approach used in the power industry relies on a static DCF analysis of the costs of
producing electricity averaged over the life cycle of the plant. Therefore, the Busbar cost
analysis is inappropriate to value modular electricity-generating capacity because it
simply ignores the expansion option, which can represent a significant source of
economic value and affect investment decisions. A real option analysis constitutes a
better tool to value the flexibility to expand capacity incrementally offered by the modular
technology.
We demonstrated that the value of the firm's option to incrementally add capacity is
particularly sensitive to the cost of the first module relative to the following ones. In
particular, we showed that the value of the expansion option is higher if the cost of each
module is the same. For example building oversized peripheral support facilities
significantly increases the capital cost the first module as compared with the following
ones and, therefore reduces the value of the firm's option.
This result has the following important implication for the future development of the
MPBR system. As noted in Section 5.1.1, the design of the peripheral support facilities
and the construction sequence of a MPBR plant are still under consideration and no
prevailing solution has been developed yet. Nevertheless based on the numerical
simulations presented in Chapter 5 we recommend that the concept of modularity, which
is already applied to the nuclear and electric components of the plant, be extended to
the design of the peripheral facilities. These facilities should be developed by stages to
support the installed capacity following the construction schedule of the modules
regardless of future eventual additions. Then by adopting a modular design for the
peripheral facilities the costs of these facilities will be spread among the modules with
the tendency of equalizing the per module capital cost. Moreover, the overall plant layout
should also be designed to allow for timely and low cost capacity expansion. All those
recommendations are to reduce the cost of the first module and to equalize the per
module capital cost, therefore increasing the value of the option to add capacity
incrementally In addition from a financing perspective, minimizing initial capital
investment also decreases financial charges and reduces the capital at risk, making the
investment more attractive.
In this respect, the sequential compound options model developed in Chapter 4 provides
a tool to compare different design scenarios: the best design being the one that
maximizes the value of the firm's expansion option.
The analysis of sequential compound options is a path-dependant problem particularly
difficult to resolve using a binomial model. Our approach suggests a simplified algorithm
to deal with the path-dependent problem with the advantage of yielding a lower bound
for the options value. However, we must point out here that some results in our analysis
are controversial; in particular, the effect of the underlying asset's volatility should be
analyzed more closely before the proposed algorithm be used in practice1.
Real option analysis is independent of personal risk preference and especially suitable
for electricity-generating assets as market information is readily available. Practical use
of real option analysis requires however careful valuation of the underlying asset and
proper estimate of its volatility. We took a simplified approach that is sufficient to
demonstrate the value of incremental capacity expansion but would not be suitable for
an applied valuation. In particular, a more precise approach would require an
appropriate stochastic model to describe the evolution of electricity prices.
Finally, we would like to extend the conclusions of this study to some notable policy
implications. First, we reiterate the argument made by Thomas (1992) that real options
analysis should be considered as a relevant tool for the selection of electric power
systems, and more particularly for the evaluation of the next generation of nuclear power
technologies. We also recommend that real options analysis be incorporated in the
regulatory framework that governs technology selection and capacity expansion
decisions in the electric power industry. In particular for the MPBR technology, the
flexibility to add capacity on a timely basis is highly dependant upon the nuclear
regulatory framework. We emphasize that it is essential for the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) to recognize that the MPBR design concept requires new
regulations that ultimately will lead to standard design certification. The recent steps
taken by the NRC go in this direction and should be continued.
See Section 5.4, sensitivity analysis on the volatility.
Modular Pebble Bed Reactor - MIT-INEEL Design
* Reactor design
Fuel
element
discharge
tube
Reducer
Singulizer
Failed fuel
separator
Scrap
container.
I
compartment
Appendix
wheel
* Main design specifications:
Thermal Power
Net electrical Rating
Core Height
Core Diameter
Pressure Vessel Height
Pressure Vessel Diameter
Number of Fuel Pebbles
Fuel Pebble Diameter
Fuel
Fuel Enrichment
Uranium Mass per Fuel Pebble
Coolant
Coolant Flow Rate (100% power)
Helium Entry/Exit Temperatures
Helium Pressure
Mean Power Density
Number of ControlRods
Numer of Absorber Ball Systems
250 MWt
110 Mwe
10 m
3m
16 m
5.6 m
360,000
60 mm
U02
8
7
Helium
120
450/850
80
3.54
6
18
g
kg/s
oC
bar
MW/m 3
* Current estimates for major components size:
Reactor core: 1U.Um x 3.Um
Reactor Pressure vessel: 16.0m x 5.6m
IHX: 3.5m 6.0m
Precooler: 8.5m 3
Gas turbine HP turbine 3 stage, maximum tip diameter 0.9m, 3m long
LP turbine 6 stage, maximum tip diameter 1.71m, 0.86m long
Compressor 15 stage, maximum tip diameter 0.73m, 1.3m long
(•naratr)r ritnr)r inmator 1 9Am -q 1 m Innn
~r(VIIVI~A~VI· IVLVI UICIIIIVLVI I · L Till) V·VIII IVlly·
* Fuel pebbles
p
OUTER ISOTROPIC PYROLYTIC CARBON
"""--' SILICON CARBIDE BARRIER COATING TRISO COATING
INNER ISOTROPIC PYROLYTIC CARBON
POROUS PYROLYTIC CARBON BUFFER
URANIUM OXYCARBIDE OR THORIUM FUEL KERNEL
* Size of the uranium fuel elements embedded in the pebbles.
Sources: Kadak 2001, a, b and c, and Kadak 1998b.
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Modular Pebble Bed Reactor:
Construction Flow Path for a Standard Unit
Event Description
0 Initial interest
1 Negotiation
2 Construction order
3 Site selection
4 Unit specific design
work
5 License Application
6 License Approval
7 Purchase order
8 Components
fabrication
9 Module assembly
The clock starts
It is estimated that standard negotiations will
take three months from the time the potential
buyer indicates interest in purchasing a plant.
Construction order is placed within one month
of the completion of negotiation.
It is assumed that the buyer already knows
where he would like to build the plant.
It is assumed that 80% of the design is
complete (standard design). The remaining
design work is only for siting conditions such
as soil conditions.
The standard design has previously obtained
NRC design certification.
A three-month period for public opposition is
required by law. In case of opposition, the
license approval process could be prolonged.
Because the design is standard and pre-
negotiated contracts with vendors are in place,
it is assumed that it will take two weeks to
place the order with the vendor.
This represents the longest time required for
any of the plant component being fabricated in
parallel. Turbines and reactor vessels take 9
months to fabricate. Any fabrication delay past
9 months will create an overall delay in the
delivery of the plant.
It is assumed that once all components have
been fabricated, a module can be assembled
and tested in 6 months. It is also assumed that
the factory is capable of having two modules
in progress at the same time, completinr the
n+lst module within three months of the n .
Step
Timeline
[weeks]
12
15
18
31
31
43
45
84
110
10 Site preparation This represents the time for the longest activity
required to support initial module assembly.
Foundation work is the limiting item and is
assumed to take a minimum of 1 year and a
maximum of 2 years. Site preparation is
conducted in parallel with components
fabrication.
11 Shipment It is assumed 1 month
shipments within the
months outside the U.S.)
(after activity 9) for
continental U.S. (3
12 Site Assembly
13 Permanent staffing
14 Construction time
15 Testing &
Fuel loading
16 Operation
Once the site is ready, it is assumed that a
unit can be moved into place and connected
within 9 months.
Staffing includes hiring and training of workers
that will operate and maintain the plant.
Reduced design and regulatory complexity
enables staff preparation in 18 months.
Time between beginning of construction and
start of operation of the unit.
Because most components can be tested in
factory, the only site testing required are an
operability test and a core test after fuel load.
The pebble bed also makes fueling much
faster. This step is assumed to take 3 months.
An additional one-month period is added to
account for eventual adjustments after testing
and production ramp-up.
Source: Kadak (1998b).
Steps 0 to 16 are required for the first unit, corresponding to a total construction time of
166 weeks. For the following modules, only steps 7 to 16 are required corresponding to
a construction time of 123 weeks.
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